The Legality and Implications of Intentional Interference with Commercial Communication Satellite Signals by Mountin, Sarah M.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Legality and Implications of  
Intentional Interference with  
Commercial Communication  
Satellite Signals 
 
 
Sarah M. Mountin 
 
 
 
90 INT’L L. STUD. 101 (2014) 
 
 
 
 
Volume 90 2014 
 
 
 
Legality of Interference with Commercial Satellite Signals Vol. 90 
 
101 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................. 103 
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS AND THE 
GROWING THREAT OF INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH SATELLITE 
SIGNALS .............................................................................................................. 109 
A. The Emergence of Satellites in the Modern World ..................................... 109 
1. Commercial Uses of Satellites ....................................................... 110 
2. Military Uses of Satellites ............................................................... 111 
3. The Military’s Increasing Reliance on Commercial Satellites ... 112 
B. Emerging Threats to Commercial Communication Satellites ...................... 114 
1. Kinetic Weapons and the Space Debris Problem ...................... 114 
2. Non-Kinetic Satellite Signal Interference .................................... 117 
III. THE TECHNICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF SATELLITES AND SATELLITE 
SIGNAL INTERFERENCE ................................................................................... 122 
A. The Basic Components of a Satellite System .............................................. 123 
1. The Components and Elements of a Satellite ............................ 123 
2. Ground Stations and Links ........................................................... 127 
B. The Technical Application of Intentional Interference ................................ 128 
1. Jamming and Spoofing ................................................................... 129 
2. The Ease of Intentional Interference ........................................... 131 
3. The Vulnerability of Commercial Communication Satellites and 
Signals ........................................................................................................ 132 
C. Legal Frameworks Governing Satellites and Intentional Interference .......... 133 
1. International Telecommunications Law ...................................... 133 
2. International Space Law ................................................................. 139 
D. The Principle of Non-Intervention ............................................................. 155 
E. International Humanitarian Law ............................................................ 157 
1. The Principle of Military Necessity .............................................. 160 
2. The Principle of Discrimination ................................................... 162 
3. The Principle of Proportionality ................................................... 164 
IV.  SATELLITE SIGNAL INTERFERENCE UNDER THE UN CHARTER ........ 166 
A. The Prohibition of the Threat or Use of Force ........................................... 166 
1. Defining the Use of Force ............................................................. 169 
2. Defining Armed Attacks ................................................................ 170 
B. Satellite Signal Interference as an Armed Attack...................................... 172 
 
 
 
 International Law Studies 2014 
102 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Current Debates over the Application of the Jus ad Bellum.... 173 
2. Assessing Satellite Signal Interference under the Effects-Based
 177 
C. Interference Conducted by Non-State Actors ............................................. 179 
V. LAWFUL RESPONSES TO SATELLITE SIGNAL INTERFERENCE ............... 183 
A.   Remedies for Internationally Wrongful Acts under State Responsibility ....... 183 
B. Countermeasures ...................................................................................... 184 
C. The International Court of Justice ............................................................. 188 
D. Responses under the UN Charter ............................................................. 188 
1. Measures Authorized by the UN Security Council .................... 189 
2. The Right of Self-Defense ............................................................. 193 
E. Legal Criteria for Engaging Self-Defense .................................................. 194 
F. Jus in Bello and Satellite Signal Interference .............................................. 195 
VI. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 196 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legality of Interference with Commercial Satellite Signals Vol. 90 
 
103 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
I 
 
The Legality and Implications of  
Intentional Interference with Commercial  
Communication Satellite Signals 
 
 
 
 
 
Sarah M. Mountin* 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
   
ommercial communication satellite systems have become essential and        
ubiquitous elements of almost every aspect of modern life.1 Both civilian 
and military sectors2 increasingly rely on satellites to advance important so-
cial, economic and military goals. Global communications are part of and 
inextricably tied to national and international economies, critical State and 
global infrastructures, national and international business, banking and fi-
nancial systems, air traffic control, electricity grids, early warning systems 
and the mass media, as well as fully integrated into national security pro-
grams and military operations.3 The space systems advancing these vital 
objectives and achieving these wide-ranging effects, however, are vulnera-
                                                                                                                      
*B.S., University of Wisconsin- Madison; J.D., University of Wisconsin Law School; 
L.L.M., McGill University, Institute of Air and Space Law.  The author is currently the 
Chief of Space Law for United States Strategic Command at Offutt Air Force Base, Ne-
braska.  The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author alone and 
do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of Defense, the United 
States Air Force, or any other government agency. 
1. David A. Koplow, ASAT-isfaction: Customary International Law and the Regulation of 
Anti-Satellite Weapons, 30 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1187, 1190 
(2009). 
2. Deborah Housen-Couriel, Disruption of Satellite Transmissions ad Bellum and in Bello: 
Launching a New Paradigm of Convergence, 45 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 431 (2012). 
3. LAWRENCE T. GREENBERG ET AL., INFORMATION WARFARE AND INTERNATION-
AL LAW 1 (1998); Housen-Couriel, supra note 2, at 437. 
 
 
 
 International Law Studies 2014 
104 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ble. Their signal transmissions can be disrupted by unintentional, accidental 
or feckless operator errors, equipment malfunctions, poorly installed 
equipment, inadvertent misuse or uncoordinated use of the already con-
gested radio frequency spectrum.4  
More ominously, as this article will discuss, satellite signals have be-
come increasingly attractive targets for intentional interference (the deliber-
ate targeting and disruption of satellite signals intended to interrupt, de-
grade or limit the performance of the targeted signal) such as deliberate 
jamming5 by State and non-State6 actors.7 “Jamming,” a type of intentional 
interference, involves overloading targeted radio frequencies with so much 
electronic noise that communications cannot get through to their intended 
destinations.8 Interference and disruptive jamming effects are accomplished 
non-kinetically and disturb the communications of the satellites (radio 
waves or links) on Earth and to and from satellites based in space.9 Disrup-
tions may also result from physical destruction of a satellite or ground sta-
tions relaying satellite transmissions. 
Commercial communication satellite capabilities enable many compo-
nents of modern societies. The strengths secured by these new advanced 
systems, however, means that their vulnerabilities serve as modern-day 
Achilles heels. So while more and more State and non-State entities depend 
                                                                                                                      
4. Ram Jakhu & Karan Singh, Space Security and Competition for Radio Frequencies and Geo-
stationary Slots, 58 ZLW 79, 83–85 (2009); Mike Gruss, Panel Ties U.S. Troop Rotations to 
Satellite Interference Spikes, SPACE NEWS (June 24, 2013), http://www.spacenews.com/art 
icle/military-space/35948military-satellite-communications-panel-ties-us-troop-rotations-
to#.Ue254RZsWR8; Ram Jakhu, Presentation delivered at the Radio Frequency Interfer-
ence & Space Sustainability Panel Discussion, Washington, DC: Satellites: Unintentional 
and Intentional Interference (June 17, 2013) [hereinafter Jahku, Satellites]. 
5. JAMES G. SAVAGE, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
REGULATION 134 (1989). 
6. For example, the Falun Gong, a banned spiritual movement in China, has repeated-
ly jammed satellites based in China and Hong Kong and broadcast its own message. See 
Falun Gong Jams Official Chinese TV, WASHINGTON POST (July 9, 2002), http://articles.chic 
agotribune.com/2002-07-09/news/0207090078_1_falun-gong-li-hongzhi-hong-kong-
based-human-rights-group.  
7. HANK RAUSCH, JAMMING COMMERCIAL SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS DURING 
WARTIME: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH IEEE INTERNATION-
AL WORKSHOP ON INFORMATION ASSURANCE, 2006 (2006). 
8. SAVAGE, supra note 5, at 134. 
9. Housen-Couriel, supra note 2, at 436. 
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on high-capacity satellite communications,10 the electromagnetic waves car-
rying data that underlie communications lack adequate protections against 
deliberate interference and jamming.11 Now the number of interference and 
jamming incidents are growing dramatically12 and the frequency of such 
events is accelerating, as is the range of actors capable of exploiting signal 
vulnerabilities.  
As this article will describe, modern-day satellite jamming often in-
volves using crude techniques, sloppy in their application. Jamming intend-
ed for one signal often disrupts other signals.13 For example, when the Lib-
yan government jammed two telecommunication satellites in 2007, dozens 
of television and radio stations serving Britain and Europe were knocked 
off the air and American diplomatic, military and FBI communications 
were severely disrupted.14  
Moreover, even though more than 80 percent of satellite jamming inci-
dents historically have been precipitated by diplomatic and political differ-
ences among nations,15 jamming is increasingly being employed to control, 
deny and degrade information needed for strategic, economic and military 
purposes.16 Jamming is especially troublesome for the U.S. military because 
it relies on dual-use commercial satellites for 80 to 90 percent of its satellite 
communications needs.17 Jamming also poses challenges for States when 
the effects are generated within their borders or by its citizens. As this arti-
cle will describe, States may be held responsible for failing to contain and 
constrain jamming activities under international law and “States directly 
menaced [by jamming] can reasonably be expected to take measures against 
                                                                                                                      
10. Ronald C. Wilgenbusch & Alan Heisig, Command and Control Vulnerabilities to Com-
munications Jamming, 69 JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY 56, 57 (2013), available at http://www.ndu 
.edu/press/lib/pdf/jfq-69/JFQ-69_toc.pdf. 
11. Id. at 57. 
12. Gruss, supra note 4. 
13. SAVAGE, supra note 5, at 135. 
14. Matthew Kleiman & Sonia McNeil, Red Lines in Outer Space, THE SPACE REVIEW 
(Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2038/1. 
15. Mohammad Ghazai, Satellite Channel Jamming Rose Sharply After Arab Spring, JOR-
DAN TIMES (May 15, 2013), http://jordantimes.com/satellite-channel-jamming-rose-
sharply-after-arab-spring.  
16. Jakhu, Satellites, supra note 4. 
17. Loren B. Thompson, Lack of Protected Satellite Communications Could Mean Defeat for 
Joint Force in Future War, LEXINGTON INSTITUTE EARLY WARNING BLOG (Apr. 14, 2010), 
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/lack-of-protected-satellite-communications-could-
mean-defeat-for-joint-force-in-future-war.  
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such threats wherever they occur.”18 Moreover, if States are unable to take 
responsive measures, it may invite intervention by other States. 
Intentional interference or jamming activities have not targeted only 
communication satellites. They present a growing problem for other dual-
use systems such as the Global Positioning System (GPS).19 In May 2012, 
South Korea accused the government of North Korea of interfering with 
and jamming GPS signals for over one thousand military and commercial 
airline flights and over 250 ships on three occasions between 2010 and 
2012.20 While none of the reportedly targeted flights or ships were subject-
ed to serious danger,21 the acts, if reported correctly, demonstrate an 
emerging reality and a growing global threat. The acts also underscore a 
serious concern for the global economic infrastructure because GPS sig-
nals, like commercial communication satellite signals, are so integrated into 
daily life and commerce that their disruption could hobble much of the 
global economy.22  
Despite treaty attempts to prohibit harmful interference with satellite 
transmissions,23 jamming incidents continue. Governments and the satellite 
industry have reacted to the growing problem of interference by applying 
political pressure on States where interference activities originate, and have 
developed new technologies to combat jamming and strengthen interna-
tional regulatory regimes.24 To date, however, such efforts are largely inef-
fective. States responsible for putting an end to interference within their 
borders often fail to take actions necessary to comply with their interna-
tional obligations and frequently ignore calls to stop unlawful interference 
                                                                                                                      
18. MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & IVAN A. VLASIC, LAW AND 
PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 284 (1963). 
19. Gruss, supra note 4. 
20. Choe Sang-Hun, Seoul Says North Korea Tries to Disrupt Air Navigation, NEW YORK 
TIMES (May 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/03/world/asia/seoul-says-nor 
th-korea-tries-to-disrupt-air-navigation.html?_r=0; Jonathan Saul, Governments Confront 
Rising Threat to Ships from Signal Jamming, REUTERS (May 30, 2013), http://www.reuters 
.com/article/2013/05/30/shipping-navigation-gps-idUSL5N0E926V20130530. 
21. Sang-Hun, supra note 20. 
22. Frank Oliveri, The Pentagon’s GPS Problem, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY (Feb. 9, 
2013), http://public.cq.com/docs/weeklyreport/weeklyreport-000004218242.html. 
23. Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union art. 45, reprinted in 
COLLECTION OF THE BASIC TEXTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UN-
ION ADOPTED BY THE PLENIPOTENTIARY CONFERENCE, 2011 (2011) [hereinafter ITU 
Constitution]. 
24. Jakhu, Satellites, supra note 4. 
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originating from their territory.25 For example, the Iranian government was 
called upon several times between 2010 and 2012 by the International 
Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, the International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU), the European Union, the governments of the United King-
dom, United States and France, and the Broadcasting Board of Governors 
to put an end to interference and cease jamming of satellite broadcasts.26 
Iranian officials, however, have yet to take any visible efforts to comply 
with these requests.27 
Further complicating the problem of satellite signal interference is that 
many States are reluctant to report jamming incidents; some suggest this is 
because these silent States too are developing and employing their own 
jamming technologies and capabilities for use against adversaries.28 Moreo-
ver, the applicable international regulatory regimes do not contain substan-
tive provisions requiring States to take forcible corrective actions to bring 
the interference and jamming to an end.29 Thus, many States struggle with 
how to protect their interests against satellite signal interference, while at 
the same time preserving their own national prerogatives and freedom of 
action. 
Satellite signal interference has become a growing phenomenon which 
poses serious social, political, economic and military consequences. This 
not only challenges existing legal frameworks applicable to satellite com-
munications, namely international telecommunications law, international 
space law and international humanitarian law (IHL), but also finds interfer-
ence occurs within an evolved political and technological reality that now 
calls for a reexamination of that framework.  
                                                                                                                      
25. Satellite Jamming in Iran: A War Over Airways, PBS (Nov. 2012), http://www.pbs. 
org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau?satelliteJammingInIranSmallMedia.pdf.  
26. Id. 
27. The Iranian government sees satellite broadcasts originating from outside the 
country as a Western front in the “soft war” being waged against their rule and a “weap-
on” intent on undermining the country’s religious and cultural beliefs. Id. 
28. Many countries such as the United States, Russia, China, Iran, Cuba, Iraq and 
North Korea have military jamming capabilities. See TOM WILSON, COMMISSION TO AS-
SESS UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION, 
THREATS TO UNITED STATES SPACE CAPABILITIES (2000), available at http://www.fas 
.org/spp/eprint/article05.html. 
29. Ram Jakhu, Regulatory Processes for Communications Satellite Radio Frequencies, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF SATELLITE APPLICATIONS 271, 287 (Joseph N. Pelton, Scott Madry & 
Sergio C. Lara eds., 2013) [hereinafter Jakhu, Regulatory Processes]. 
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Accordingly, this article addresses some of the rules applicable to satel-
lite signal interference in peacetime, as well as during armed conflict. In 
doing so, this article first differentiates unlawful interference incidents that 
cause temporary, reversible, interruptions from those that could constitute 
a prohibited use of force under Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United 
Nations (UN). This article then asserts that, because unlawful interference 
with satellite signals can lead to devastating consequences and can pose a 
fundamental threat to States, satellite signal interference may, in certain cir-
cumstances, amount to an armed attack justifying the exercise of individual 
or collective self-defense pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter. 
Understanding how satellite signal interference should be characterized 
in the international legal framework is important for a number of reasons. 
First, it helps States understand which legal regime applies. For instance, 
unlawful satellite signal interference not amounting to a use of force under 
Article 2(4) is governed by the regulatory regime under the ITU and under 
international space law. If, however, satellite signal interference were to 
constitute a use of force or rise to the level of an armed attack, internation-
al laws governing a decision to resort to the use of force (jus ad bellum) and 
laws governing the conduct of hostilities (jus in bello) would apply.  
Second, determining the threshold for what constitutes a use of force 
in the context of satellite signal interference is important for understanding 
peacetime operations by States and militaries. Clarifying possibilities of 
permissible interference in peacetime dictates when treaty obligations are 
triggered, and determines whether and when UN Security Council authori-
zation may be required. 
Third, characterizing the legal implications of satellite signal interfer-
ence is imperative because armed conflict has obvious consequences. 
Commercial communication satellites and their signals are and will contin-
ue to be targets due to the military’s heavy reliance on these systems for 
communications and operations. Commercial systems usually provide cost-
effective solutions to information requirements and allow for surge during 
crisis circumstances. It is therefore necessary for States to understand what 
rules apply in advance of armed conflict and the legal parameters of a legit-
imate response to satellite signal interference.30 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
30. Housen-Couriel, supra note 2, at 434–35. 
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II. THE IMPORTANCE OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS AND THE  
GROWING THREAT OF INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH  
SATELLITE SIGNALS 
 
Before considering the circumstances under which satellite signal interfer-
ence may be unlawful and the permissible responses to such acts, it is im-
portant to briefly address the extent to which satellites are integrated into 
modern life. It is also imperative to explore why and how interference with 
satellite signals is emerging as a serious threat to space systems—military 
and civilian—all around the world. Without proper context, evaluating the 
emerging problem, its implications and the applicable normative frame-
works would have little meaning.  
 
A. The Emergence of Satellites in the Modern World 
 
The exploration and use of outer space has rapidly expanded since Sputnik 
I, the first satellite launched into orbit by the Soviet Union in 1957.31 Outer 
space is no longer the sole domain of the original dueling “space powers,” 
the Soviet Union and the United States, and satellites are more useful now 
than was ever realized at the dawn of the “Space Age.” Technological ad-
vances and scientific developments have made space more accessible to 
people everywhere,32 and space-based technologies, specifically satellites 
and their transmissions, have become critically important to almost every 
aspect of modern day life.33  
Decades ago, satellites were primarily used by the United States and the 
Soviet Union for maintaining peace and security through reconnaissance 
and intelligence-gathering; arms control monitoring and compliance; mis-
sile warning weapons detection; survivable strategic, global, and regional 
communications; meteorology; and precision navigation and timing sys-
tems.34 Now, satellite-based technologies are indispensable to a variety of 
civilian, space, science and commercial applications, to include communica-
                                                                                                                      
31. MANFRED LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE: AN EXPERIENCE IN CONTEMPO-
RARY LAW MAKING 1(1972). 
32. Jakhu & Singh, supra note 4, at 74. 
33. Koplow, supra note 1, at 1190. 
34. Laura Grego, A History of Anti-Satellite Programs, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIEN-
TISTS (Jan. 2012), http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/a-history-of-ASAT-
programs_lo-res.pdf; Elizabeth S. Waldrop, Integration of Military and Civilian Space Assets: 
Legal and National Security Implications 5 (2003) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, McGill University 
Institute of Air and Space Law). 
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tions, meteorology and remote sensing. For example, of the 1,046 satellites 
currently orbiting Earth, approximately 59 percent are used for communi-
cation purposes, 9 percent for remote sensing, 8 percent for navigation, 7 
percent for military surveillance, 5 percent for space science and 4 percent 
for meteorology.35 Additionally, the U.S. Air Force’s GPS constellation, 
originally developed for military purposes, now provides the foundation for 
nearly all global commercial space-based navigation and timing.  
 
1. Commercial Uses of Satellites 
 
In 2001, Dr. Steven Lambakis of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, noted 
“the services provided by communications satellites are woven into the 
fabric of our lives. They were, and are, the true catalyst for globalization, or 
the worldwide melding together of different financial and economic sys-
tems.”36 Commercial satellites relay hundreds of television programs and 
thousands of telephone calls at the same time.37 Commercial satellites also 
provide global connectivity and enable instantaneous communications and 
sharing of critical human, social, political and economic information on a 
worldwide scale via the Internet.38 Commercial satellites support voice, data 
and mobile networks when wired capabilities are absent,39 supplement fiber 
networks and are integral to private networks transmitting financial transac-
tions between banks.40  
Commercial communication satellite systems are also important in 
maintaining the international economy, transportation systems and emer-
gency services.41 This is especially evident with the GPS satellite system,42 
                                                                                                                      
35. UCS Satellite Database, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa 
.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/space_weapons/technical_issues/ucs-
satellite-database.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2014); see also Koplow, supra note 1, at 1190. 
36. STEVEN J. LAMBAKIS, ON THE EDGE OF EARTH: THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN 
SPACE POWER 15 (2001). 
37. John E. Oberright, Artificial Satellites, NASA (2004), https://www.nasa.gov/ 
worldbook/artificial_satellites_worldbook.html.  
38 OLAF ACKER, FLORAN POTSCHER & THIERRY LEFORT, WHY SATELLITES MAT-
TER: THE RELEVANCE OF COMMERCIAL SATELLITES IN THE 21ST CENTURY—A PER-
SPECTIVE 2012–2020 (2012), available at http://www.esoa.net/mwg-internal/de5fs23hu7 
3ds/progress?id=CTYE8Rwtig. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Ryan McClure, International Adjudication Options in Response to State-Sponsored Cyber-
Attacks Against Outer Space Satellites, 18 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
AND COMPARATIVE LAW ANNUAL 431, 433 (2012). 
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which is integrated into smart phones, law enforcement operations, and the 
navigation and positioning of cars, airplanes, ships, as well as in the fleet 
management of trucks,43 and many aspects of the world’s economy and 
commerce,44 e.g., the Society for World Interbank Financial Telecommuni-
cation (SWIFT) system of international monetary transfer. Without access 
to the SWIFT system, it is not possible to wire money or deposit a check 
sent from another country.45  
Thousands of companies and governments around the world use GPS 
signals to timestamp contractual agreements and financial transactions.46 
The shipping industry relies on satellite navigation services to avoid under-
water hazards and stay within shipping channels, and on commercial com-
munications systems to talk with shipping centers, schedule port arrivals 
and report emergencies or maintenance requirements.47 Even the On-Star 
service used in automobiles utilizes commercial communication and satel-
lite navigation services to detect and report malfunctions, unlock doors and 
locate stolen cars, and for emergency response.48 GPS is so integrated into 
modern life that a loss could have devastating effects. A disruption of GPS 
timing signals could disable cellular phone and computer networks around 
the world, disrupt the global banking and financial systems, and interrupt 
the operation of electrical power distribution systems.49  
 
2. Military Uses of Satellites 
 
Satellite technologies, applications and capabilities have also revolutionized 
military operations. Today, satellites are incorporated into almost all mod-
ern military weapons (e.g., precision-guided munitions and unmanned aerial 
                                                                                                                      
42. The United States operates the GPS system, China operates the BeiDou Naviga-
tion Satellite System, Russia operates the GLONASS system and Europe operates the 
Galileo system. 
43. FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 389–90 (2009). 
44. Oliveri, supra note 22. 
45. Joy Gordon, The U.S. Embargo against Cuba and the Diplomatic Challenges to Extraterri-
toriality, 36 FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS 63, 70 (2012). 
46. LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 43, at 390; ACKER, POTSCHER & LEFORT, supra note 
38. 
47. Paul W. Gydesen, What Is the Impact to National Security Without Commercial Space 
Applications 9 (Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, Research Paper, 2006), 
available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc/gydesen.pdf. 
48. Id. 
49. WILSON, supra note 28, at IV(B); Norman Martello, Where in the World?, 24 ELEC-
TRIC PERSPECTIVES 14, 17 (Mar./Apr. 1999). 
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vehicles), operations, communications and command and control sys-
tems.50 The U.S. military relies on satellites to gather intelligence, conduct 
surveillance and photoreconnaissance, locate and track troop and ship 
movement, enable precision-guided munitions, monitor weather patterns 
and detect missile attacks.51 However, the United States is not alone in pur-
suing these technologies and applications; other countries including Russia 
and China increasingly rely on satellites for active military support and op-
erations.52 
U.S. military reliance on satellites for military operations, communica-
tions, and command and control is not a new phenomenon. During the 
first Gulf War, the “the first space war,”53 the U.S. military relied on satel-
lites to conduct military operations and provide instantaneous global com-
munications.54 The military communications element alone consisted of 
118 mobile ground stations and twelve commercial satellite terminals that 
provided 329 voice and thirty message circuits that handled approximately 
seven hundred thousand telephone calls and 152,000 messages daily.55 
More than thirty-five thousand tactical radio frequencies were also used.56  
 
3. The Military’s Increasing Reliance on Commercial Satellites 
 
Even though the U.S. military has long maintained its own satellite assets 
and network, it is now increasingly dependent on commercial space assets 
owned and operated by domestic, foreign and even international entities.57 
This is mostly due to greater cooperation between military and non-military 
                                                                                                                      
50. GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 3, at 1. 
51. Michael N. Schmitt, International Law and Military Operations in Space, 10 MAX 
PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 89, 90 (2006) [hereinafter Schmitt, Mili-
tary Operations in Space]. 
52. Grego, supra note 34; Housen-Couriel, supra note 2, at 438. 
53. Ivan A. Vlasic, Space Law and the Military Applications of Space Technology, in PER-
SPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 385, 388 (Nandasiri Jasentuliyana ed, 1995). 
54. Jackson N. Maogoto & Steven Freeland, Space Weaponization and the United Nations 
Charter Regime on Force: A Thick Legal Fog or a Receding Mist?, 41 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 
1091, 1104 (2007). 
55. Sean P. Kanuck, Information Warfare: New Challenges for Public International Law, 37 
HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 272, 282 (1996), citing ALVIN TOFFLER & 
HEIDI TOFFLER, WAR AND ANTI-WAR: MAKING SENSE OF TODAY’S GLOBAL CHAOS 79 
(1993). 
56. Kanuck, supra note 55, at 282, citing TOFFLER & TOFFLER, supra note 55, at 69–
70. 
57. Waldrop, supra note 34 at 1, 17–18.  
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entities over the past few decades,58 as well as the military’s desire to capi-
talize on technical expertise and avoid duplicating efforts.59 Additionally, 
the technologies and applications employed on commercial satellites are 
inherently dual-use in nature, and thus capable of providing the military 
with communications and data needed to operate.60  
Almost all satellites in orbit are dual-use, that is, they can perform mis-
sions supporting both military and civilian applications. Commercial re-
mote sensing satellites allowing us to view our neighborhoods from outer 
space on Google Earth can also be used to track military operations in con-
flict.61 GPS navigation and timing signals directing civilians to gas stations 
and supermarkets are tied into ATMs, the power grid and cellular phone 
systems, and are used by over eight hundred thousand U.S. military receiv-
ers.62 Commercial satellites enabling video chat via computers with friends 
across the country and around the world also allow operators to surf the 
Internet on international flights and also carry between 80–90 percent of all 
U.S. military communications,63 making the U.S. military the global satellite 
communication industry’s biggest single customer.64  
U.S. military operational needs for versatile communications and 
bandwidths65 have increased so rapidly that military satellites are no longer 
able to meet ever-expanding demands.66 The U.S. military increasingly 
looks to commercial operators to provide more and more services, and 
even turns to foreign providers and States for help. In fact, the U.S. mili-
tary’s burgeoning thirst for satellite communications and bandwidth over 
the African continent is swelling so fast the United States recently signed a 
one-year, ten million dollar lease with the Chinese company operating the 
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61. Matthew Burris, Presentation online U.S. Air Force JAG Corps: U.S. Space Secu-
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Apstar-7 satellite.67 While some U.S. officials and military pundits publically 
and loudly expressed concern over data passing through Chinese space as-
sets because China is a potential military competitor, the fact remains: 
“Every new drone feed and every new soldier with a satellite radio creates 
more appetite for bandwidth—an appetite the military can’t hope to fill 
with military spacecraft alone.”68 This trend of relying on commercial and 
foreign satellite providers is unlikely to abate in the near future because, as 
noted by U.S. Air Force Space Commander, General C. Robert Kehler, 
“space capabilities . . . are embedded in all of our combat operations. 
They’re also embedded in our military operations, short of combat, across 
the board. . . . [W]e cannot fight the way America fights without space ca-
pabilities.”69 Finally, U.S. national space policy encourages the support of 
U.S. commercial space activities by requiring the “[p]urchase and use [of] 
commercial space capabilities to the maximum practical extent when such 
capabilities and services are available in the marketplace and meet United 
States Government requirements.”70 
Satellites have evolved significantly over the last sixty years. Satellites 
not only improve the lives of billions of people everywhere, they also fun-
damentally change the way the world communicates, conducts business, 
governs and provides education, and transforms the way militaries fight 
and win wars.71 At the same time, however, such overwhelming depend-
ence on commercial communication satellites and their transmissions pre-
sents a national security vulnerability that has become an attractive target 
for exploitation by potential State and non-State adversaries. 
 
B. Emerging Threats to Commercial Communication Satellites 
 
1. Kinetic Weapons and the Space Debris Problem 
 
Spacefaring nations will likely pursue non-kinetic measures that are both 
temporary and reversible within outer space in future conflicts due to the 
                                                                                                                      
67. Noah Shachtman, Pentagon Paying China—Yes, China —To Carry Data, WIRED (Apr. 
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environmental threat caused by kinetic weapons and the expense in deploy-
ing traditional anti-satellite weapons. Until recently, it was thought that to 
disrupt or disable a satellite system, an adversary needed to either destroy a 
satellite’s Earth-based station or the satellite itself72 by way of kinetic at-
tacks through the use of anti-satellite weapons (ASATs),73 which are “direct 
ascent and co-orbital systems that employ various mechanisms to affect or 
destroy an on-orbit spacecraft.”74 ASATs include high-altitude nuclear ex-
plosions, kinetic-energy weapons, directed energy weapons and ballistic 
missiles.75 However, only a few well-financed State actors with the requisite 
sophistication and technical know-how can acquire and deploy ASAT 
weapons.76 Kinetic attacks are also very expensive and responsibility for 
such attacks can easily be attributed with relative certainty.77 Moreover, 
physically destroying a satellite seriously threatens the long-term space en-
vironment by creating hundreds of thousands of pieces of space debris. 
Space debris is one of the greatest concerns with employing kinetic 
ASATs because “what goes up” does not necessarily come down.78 An ob-
ject launched into space must either be brought back down to Earth by 
deliberate deorbiting, or, depending on its orbit, the object will fall out of 
orbit to return to Earth.79 Generally, the further out into space an object is 
located, the longer it will take to reenter Earth’s atmosphere. Atmospheric 
phenomenology, solar events, and object mass, shape and density also af-
fect the equation on how soon an object will deorbit. Space objects and 
debris located in low earth orbit (LEO), an altitude of approximately 65–
310 miles (104–500 kilometers) above Earth’s surface,80 can reenter Earth’s 
atmosphere in approximately ten years.81 Debris orbiting further away, 
however, such as within the geosynchronous orbit (GEO) at an altitude of 
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approximately 22,000 miles (35,400 kilometers)82 can remain in orbit for 
hundreds of years.83 Regardless of where space debris is located in outer 
space, satellite operators must continually manage and minimize collision 
risks.  
A single collision can be catastrophic. Such an event, involving suffi-
ciently large objects and satellites, can produce hundreds of thousands of 
fragments,84 which, depending on the orbit, can trigger other collisions, 
thereby causing a cascade of subsequent collisions.85 Put another way, not 
only is there a prompt and pervasive debris environment, but also addi-
tional collisions with that debris imperil space objects and make orbits 
completely unusable, especially if debris continues to collect indefinitely.86  
The extent of the problem of space debris was brought to the fore on 
January 11, 2007 when the Chinese launched a solid-fuel, medium range 
ballistic missile at its own weather satellite, Feng-Yun-1C.87 When the mis-
sile collided with the Chinese satellite, it created a debris cloud containing 
over two million pieces measuring between one millimeter and one centi-
meter, over forty thousand pieces of debris between one centimeter and 
ten centimeters (slightly larger than a baseball)88 and over nine hundred 
pieces of trackable debris measuring over ten centimeters.89 The smaller 
pieces cannot be tracked. A piece larger than one centimeter can destroy a 
satellite, damage the space shuttle and ruin an astronaut’s day.90 
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Within minutes of the Chinese ASAT event, a debris cloud started 
spreading through the satellite’s original orbital plane.91 Ten days later, the 
debris cloud spread through the entire orbital plane, resulting in a “ring” of 
debris,92 orbiting at speeds up to 29,400 miles per hour (seventeen times 
the speed of a bullet fired from a machine gun).93 Three years later, the de-
bris was spread throughout much of LEO.94 Most of the debris will remain 
in orbit for decades, thereby posing a collision threat to other space ob-
jects,95 including the International Space Station. The debris threatens sev-
eral hundred satellites on a daily basis and will remain in orbit for over one 
hundred years.96 With these points in mind, it is easy to see how and why 
destroying a satellite through kinetic means is a significant threat to the 
space environment, and is increasingly seen by many States as a method of 
last resort.97  
 
2. Non-Kinetic Satellite Signal Interference 
 
Over the last few years, non-kinetic threats to space systems have emerged. 
One of these threats garnering significant attention is computer network 
attacks (CNAs).98 Another much less sophisticated threat is intentional in-
terference with satellite signals. While CNAs are increasingly recognized as 
a significant threat, little attention is paid to intentional interference with 
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communication signals.99 This is surprising since intentional interference 
with electromagnetic signals was long ago identified as a serious threat to 
States.100 In any event, enemy communications have long been considered 
valid and traditional military targets.101 
Intentional interference with satellite signals is more than a mere hypo-
thetical possibility.102 It occurs regularly and costs commercial operators 
and end-users millions of dollars each year. These costs include lost reve-
nue opportunities, a loss of customers, specialized personnel costs, and the 
price of interference protection and detection systems.103 Long-term costs 
may include erosion of the company’s reputation as a reliable service pro-
vider. A satellite operator or owner could also lose the investment in the 
satellite itself, as well as future profits. Finally, without sufficient, dependa-
ble access to satellite communications, military forces could be rendered 
blind and deaf. As can be seen, satellite signal interference is a matter of 
concern for operators and users, military and civilian alike.  
In one of the earliest and most notorious jamming incidents in 1986, 
“Captain Midnight” used commercially available equipment to overpower 
the Home Box Office (HBO) channel and broadcast a message protesting 
HBO’s rise in fees.104 The thirty-minute text message was transmitted to all 
HBO customers in the eastern half of the United States.105 Even though 
Captain Midnight’s actions only achieved a temporary disruption to HBO’s 
connection with its customers, it nonetheless demonstrated how quickly 
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and easily jamming can be employed to disrupt satellite communications 
and how far reaching the effects can extend. 
Intentional interference with commercial communication satellite sig-
nals is an even bigger concern today than it was in 1986. The magnitude of 
the problem is revealed in several ways. As discussed above, there are 
simply not enough dedicated military satellites capable of providing the 
requisite bandwidth, coverage and capabilities needed by military forces.106 
Moreover, commercial communication satellite systems are not designed or 
built with the technologies and capabilities necessary to protect against ma-
licious interference or jamming.107 Consequently, space systems providing 
asymmetric advantages to twenty-first century militaries are themselves 
tempting targets to those that could never win a war against a highly tech-
nical military by using troops, tanks and planes.108  
Second, boundaries once separating military and commercial space as-
sets are vanishing; civilian objects are increasingly intermingled with mili-
tary objectives, and civilian and military satellite systems and supporting 
networks are increasingly interconnected. This interconnectivity empowers 
potential adversaries to threaten both military and civilian operators and 
end-users as intentional disruptions of signals are not necessarily confined 
to a single intended targeted signal. The disruption of one signal can have 
wide ranging effects on adjacent signals resulting in a sequence of disrup-
tions.109 
One such example occurred in 2007 when the Libyan government 
jammed two telecommunication satellites owned by Thuraya Satellite Tele-
communications of Abu Dhabi in an effort to block incoming news chan-
nels and communications from the outside world. The single event not on-
ly knocked dozens of television and radio stations serving Britain and Eu-
rope off the air, it also disrupted U.S. diplomatic, military and FBI com-
munications.110 Likewise, targeting and intentionally disrupting military 
transmissions in an armed conflict may unintentionally disrupt civilian 
transmissions that may be fundamental for civilian or commercial services 
such as financial transactions, emergency notification networks and com-
mercial air traffic control systems. Results could include economic chaos, 
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widespread panic and even death, if, for example, the stock market crashes, 
essential State services become unavailable or those unable to obtain basic 
needs turn to violence.111 Intentional interference with satellite signals dur-
ing war thus poses a serious challenge to the rules of IHL,112 which requires 
parties to a conflict to distinguish between civilians, civilian objects and 
military objectives at all times.  
Even though there are no known instances of satellite signal interfer-
ence where injury or death to the civilian population resulted, it is certainly 
possible. Hypothetically speaking, what if the GPS satellite signal carrying 
data to an unmanned armed military aerial vehicle was replaced with a false 
signal?113 The pilot or drone might believe it was somewhere different than 
where it was and fire a missile on a civilian (and unintended) target. While 
this scenario may seem purely speculative, the 2011 capture of a U.S. mili-
tary drone by Iran is claimed by Iranians to have resulted from a jamming 
attack causing the pilot to accidentally land the plane in Iran, believing he 
was landing the drone at a military base in Afghanistan.114 As another ex-
ample, consider what could happen if the communication signals between a 
satellite operator and a satellite were interfered with, rendering the satellite 
unable to maneuver in space. The satellite could crash into another satellite 
causing it and many other space objects significant damage. Financial losses 
would be substantial in terms of the damage to the satellites and lost reve-
nues as well. If communication signals using the lost or damaged systems 
were not rapidly moved to other satellite transponders, civilian business 
and monetary transactions could be interrupted or prevented resulting in 
worldwide financial losses (or gains).  
Illustrating this point is the financial losses occurring after the Septem-
ber 11, 2011 airline terrorist attacks on New York and the Pentagon. The 
International Organization of Securities Commissions concluded the finan-
cial maneuvers and stock market trading just prior to the attacks amounted 
to several hundred million dollars, constituting “the most important crime 
of insider trading ever committed.”115 Profits went to “someone, some-
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where,” but were never traced.116 If terrorists had insider information about 
the attacks and purchased financial derivatives before the attack, they may 
have made millions from the subsequent market moves.117 This money 
could easily fund terrorism activities for years. Similar effects might occur if 
informed investors conducted similar trading maneuvers in advance of 
well-coordinated jamming attacks targeting commercial communication 
satellite systems. 
Third, the frequency, complexity and sophistication of intentional in-
terference incidents are escalating, while the cost of conducting such at-
tacks and the skills needed to use jamming technologies are decreasing.118 
Locating sources of interference and distinguishing a bona fide jamming 
attack from other forms of communication degradations or disruptions 
caused by systemic disturbances or natural phenomena like solar flares and 
astronomical storms is also difficult.119 Moreover, non-State entities, terror-
ist cells and enemy combatants are increasingly engaged in jamming activi-
ties or attacks.120 These facts illuminate the current challenges faced by 
States, most notably the problem of attribution. 
For example, consider a situation where a terrorist organization jams 
the radio communications of two U.S. commercial airplanes and, unable to 
communicate with each other, the planes collide over New York City. As 
witnessed by the 9/11 attacks, fatalities, financial damage and property 
losses would be substantial. Now assume the U.S. determined the incident 
was an armed attack, thereby invoking its right of self-defense and justify-
ing a use of force response. If following international law, the United States 
would want to identify the perpetrator and attribute the act to a responsible 
party or State before determining the appropriate response. This scenario 
highlights the range of technical challenges and legal considerations States 
will face if satellite signal interference becomes more prevalent—and per-
haps even destructive. 
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Finally, whereas the ITU legal regime was once somewhat effective in 
helping States resolve incidents of intentional interference through diplo-
matic and political channels, its normative framework is now proving to be 
insufficient and ill equipped to do so. Regulations requiring States to pre-
vent and stop interference originating from within their borders are being 
increasingly ignored, and States are reluctant to give the ITU enforcement 
powers. As a result, satellite owners and operators feel compelled to con-
stantly develop new technologies to protect against intentional interference, 
while continually improving and advancing their own technological capabil-
ities to employ intentional interference offensively. In other words, States 
are struggling with how to protect themselves from the consequences of 
satellite signal interference, but at the same time are expanding both their 
peacetime and warfare capabilities. However, as States pursue these com-
peting interests, new threats to international stability and space security are 
emerging.121  
The range of impacts described above suggests a myriad of bad actors 
have, can and will continue to exploit satellite transmission vulnerabili-
ties.122 These vulnerabilities represent not just a U.S. military problem, but 
also a national security problem, a space security problem, an environmen-
tal problem, a law enforcement problem and a business security problem.123 
For these reasons, it is necessary to re-examine the framework applicable to 
satellite communications, the emerging trends and their implications. 
 
III. THE TECHNICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF SATELLITES AND  
SATELLITE SIGNAL INTERFERENCE 
 
This Section explores how satellites function, how interference with satel-
lite signals occurs and why commercial communication satellites are in-
creasingly vulnerable to disruptions. This discussion is necessary to under-
stand how satellites operate, how their signals are transmitted to and from 
Earth or between satellites, and how satellite transmissions are temporarily 
disrupted through electromagnetic interference without physically destroy-
ing the satellite or components within its system.  
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This Section also examines the legal norms applicable to satellite 
transmissions under the International Telecommunications Union and in-
ternational space law (ISL). This Section concludes existing norms are not 
equipped to handle the range of impacts emerging as more and more State 
and non-State actors engage in satellite signal interference. Finally, implica-
tions of satellite signal interference under IHL will be addressed. This Sec-
tion reveals that, because IHL cannot adequately protect commercial 
communication satellites, incidents of intentional interference are likely to 
continue, impacts may become increasingly widespread and severe, and the 
civilian population may suffer significant harm in future armed conflicts.  
 
A. The Basic Components of a Satellite System 
 
A satellite system is comprised of the satellite, the ground control station 
used to operate and control the satellite, communication stations and radio 
links allowing communication between satellites and ground stations.124 All 
satellite components are susceptible to physical attacks and/or sabotage;125 
however, some components are more susceptible to non-kinetic attacks, 
such as intentional interference or jamming.126 This Section briefly address-
es major elements of a common satellite system and focuses on those most 
vulnerable to non-kinetic disruptions caused by intentional interference or 
jamming. 
 
1. The Components and Elements of a Satellite 
 
Generally speaking, satellites are comprised of a satellite bus, payload, solar 
panels, communication devices, and receiving and transmitting antennas.127 
The satellite bus is the central metal structure or body to which other com-
ponents are attached.128 The bus carries the payload(s) and is comprised of 
subsystems, including the power supply, antennas, and mechanical and 
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thermal control subsystems.129 The bus is durable enough to sustain launch 
stresses and is designed to protect components within from threats such as 
solar heat and some laser attacks.130 The solar panels, attached to the satel-
lite bus, are the main power source.131 Electricity generated by the solar 
panels is stored in rechargeable batteries.132 Without the ability to generate 
and/or store power, a satellite will not function properly, send or receive 
signals, or communicate with its Earth-based operator.  
If a satellite or its components are damaged, they cannot be repaired.133 
A fatally damaged satellite has to either be deorbited and returned to Earth 
or propelled further up into outer space and into a “graveyard,” “disposal,” 
or “junkyard” orbit.134 If communication with a damaged satellite is impos-
sible or the satellite cannot be deorbited or launched into a graveyard orbit, 
it will remain in the orbit and become space debris, an uncontrollable pro-
jectile capable of devastating effects. 
The payload, which differs for every satellite, includes all mission-
specific components necessary to accomplish an intended purpose or spe-
cific tasks.135 For example, the payload for a communications satellite in-
cludes radio receivers, transmitters and transponders136 for collecting, relay-
ing or rebroadcasting television or telephone signals.137 A payload for a re-
connaissance satellite includes high-resolution telescopes and cameras to 
capture images of Earth during the day and night, as well as in all types of 
weather conditions.138 Regardless of payload, any interference with signals 
received or transmitted by the satellite or payload can have similar effects. 
The satellite may not function properly, its mission will be impaired and 
disruptions could reverberate globally. 
                                                                                                                      
129. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, supra note 125, at 3. 
130. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 102, at 110. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. Graveyard orbits, normally located beyond the geostationary orbit some 22,236 
miles above Earth’s equator, are used for satellites that are too expensive, too difficult or 
too dangerous (such as containing nuclear or radioactive materials) to deorbit. LYALL & 
LARSEN, supra note 43, at 246. 
135. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, supra note 125, at 3. 
136. A transponder receives a transmission, amplifies it and transmits it to Earth or to 
another satellite, possibly at a different frequency. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 102, at 113. 
137. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, supra note 125, at 3. 
138. Stephen Clark, Reconnaissance Satellites Launched by H-2A Rocket, SPACEFLIGHT 
NOW (Jan. 27, 2013), http://www.spaceflightnow.com/h2a/f22/#.UbdxspVsWR8.  
 
 
 
Legality of Interference with Commercial Satellite Signals Vol. 90 
 
125 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The on-board computer, located within the bus, monitors the satellite, 
controls its actions and processes collected data.139 In some specialized or 
highly protected satellites like military satellites, the on-board computer 
may also utilize anti-jamming computer software.140 Most non-military 
commercial satellites and their on-board computers are relatively unpro-
tected from jamming attacks.141 This is because they are designed for cheap 
and easy access and are not equipped to protect against interference.142 As a 
result, commercial satellites fall victim to an increasing number of jamming 
attacks.143 For example, Eutelsat reported deliberate jamming increased 
dramatically, going from fifty-four cases in 2010 to over 340 in 2012 by the 
first of November.144  
There are also numerous incidents of jamming by State and non-State 
actors. In 2003, Iran used a jamming device located in Cuba to block 
American media transmissions from the Telestar-12 satellite into Iran.145 In 
2004, the non-State entity, Falun Gong, jammed a Hong Kong based satel-
lite and instead broadcast its own message.146 In 2009 and 2010, Iran 
jammed Intelsat satellite broadcasts into Iran.147 Then, in 2010, Brazilian 
hackers disrupted the U.S. Navy’s satellite, FLTSAT-8.148 Finally, in 2012, 
when Syria joined Iran in jamming over twenty-five radio and television 
international broadcasts, including the BBC, France 24, Deutsche Welle, 
the Voice of America, Nilesat and Arabsat, hundreds of millions of people 
from northwestern Europe to Afghanistan were affected.149  
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The communications system is considered the heart of a satellite.150 It is 
made of a transmitter, a receiver and antennae, and forms the radio link 
between all satellites, their Earth-based ground stations and possibly other 
satellites, depending on the specific mission of the satellite.151 Radio links 
transmit, transfer and receive all satellite signals (radio frequencies carrying 
data) to and from Earth, as well as from other satellites.152 Radio links are 
highly vulnerable to interference and when disrupted deny satellite com-
munications,153 making a satellite useless.154 
Radio waves comprise part of the electromagnetic spectrum, the spec-
trum of all frequencies of electromagnetic radiation.155 While the electro-
magnetic spectrum includes x-rays, gamma rays, ultraviolet light, visible 
light rays and radio waves, only visible light rays are detectable by hu-
mans.156 Despite being invisible to the naked eye, radio waves used in satel-
lite operations can be tracked and located relatively easily157 because they 
travel via line-of-sight connections from the sending location to the receiv-
ing location.158 Tracking is accomplished through antennas, which gather 
and track information to precisely locate the transmission signal and source 
of the signal in both time and space.159  
Every satellite requires and utilizes radio links to and from Earth for 
communication purposes and for accurately monitoring satellite function 
and health. These radio links are known as telemetry, tracking and com-
mand (TT&C).160 Telemetry refers to the data transfer process (containing 
specific details on the health and status of the satellite) from the satellite to 
the ground.161 Tracking locates the satellite in time and space based on po-
sition, speed and range measurements.162 Command is the method of 
commanding and controlling the satellite from the ground via the transmis-
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sion of signals while the satellite is in line of sight of a ground station.163 
TT&C is essential and basically the same for all satellites, regardless of mis-
sion.164  
Any interference with TT&C signals could cause significant damage. 
Without TT&C, operators could lose control of a satellite, resulting in an 
uncontrolled satellite colliding with other satellites. TT&C transmissions, 
however, are generally protected by way of encryption and encoding.165 
Therefore, TT&C transmissions are not the element of satellite communi-
cations that are most vulnerable to interference or disruptions,166 and fur-
ther discussions on TT&C will be intentionally limited. Regardless, tech-
nical aspects of satellite signal interference discussed herein would, general-
ly speaking, apply in the same way to TT&C transmissions as they would to 
almost all satellite transmissions. However, because satellite signal interfer-
ence is usually employed as a means to disrupt communications temporari-
ly, rather than to cause physical damage, it is unlikely TT&C signals will be 
targeted unless physical destruction of a satellite is intended.  
In addition to the elements described above, satellites also have attitude 
and control systems, and propulsion subsystems. Gyroscopes, accelerome-
ters and guidance systems control the satellite and keep it positioned in the 
right direction for communications and data collection.167 The propulsion 
system, comprised of engines and thrusters, maintains station keeping, con-
trol and maneuvering.168 Any malfunction of or interference with these sys-
tems could endanger other satellites.169 Therefore, satellite operators must 
monitor, control and communicate with satellites at all times through radio 
signals sent to satellites via Earth-based ground stations. 
 
2. Ground Stations and Links 
 
Satellite operators control, track, monitor and communicate with satellites 
via high-powered, high frequency radio signals emitted from ground-based 
stations using antennas.170 Ground stations and antennas can be large, 
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small, stationary or mobile.171 A satellite can communicate with a single 
ground station, such as a control station for TT&C purposes, or with hun-
dreds of ground stations or antennas at the same time as it is transmitting 
or receiving data such as video or voice communications.172 In addition to 
sending and receiving satellite signals, ground stations have inherent jam-
ming capabilities.173 The area receiving a radio signal of useful strength 
from the satellite is known as the satellite’s coverage area or footprint.174  
Pathways used to communicate with satellites are called links.175 A radio 
signal transmitted from the ground station up to a satellite is the uplink;176 
the radio signal traveling down from the satellite to the ground station is 
the downlink;177 crosslinks transmit signals between satellites.178 Uplink and 
downlink radio signals are most vulnerable to interference or jamming be-
cause their signal strength is so low. By the time they reach the receiving 
antenna, the original signal can be easily overpowered by a stronger radio 
signal.179 Crosslinks would be most vulnerable to space-based jammers. 
 
B. The Technical Application of Intentional Interference 
 
Jamming equipment is easy to make and/or buy.180 Jamming is not com-
plex or technically demanding.181 It is also increasingly available to, and 
employed by, States, as well as non-State entities.182 Thus, for a State or 
non-State entity engaged in a conflict with a country dependent on space-
based technologies, disrupting satellite transmissions could be the principal 
determinant of victory. A July 2000 Chinese report noted, “[f]or countries 
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that could never win a war by using the method of tanks and planes, attack-
ing the U.S. space system may be an irresistible and most tempting 
choice.”183 This has been recognized by the United States as a probable 
act.184 In fact, the Gulf War might have turned out differently had Iraqi mil-
itary forces been able to successfully disrupt satellite signals relied on so 
heavily by U.S. forces.185  
 
1. Jamming and Spoofing 
 
Jamming, the term most often associated with intentional disruption of sat-
ellite communications, refers to temporary interference of radio signals or 
communications between a satellite and its receiver or users on the 
ground.186 The object is to render radio transmissions unintelligible by 
causing interference.187 It is accomplished by overpowering signals emitting 
noise sent to and received by the satellite or using a second signal at the 
same frequency or higher power, preventing the receiver from collecting 
the real signal.188 The jamming signal is often meaningless noise that 
drowns out the real signal189 in the form of “harmful interference.”190 
There are two forms of satellite jamming: orbital jamming and terrestri-
al jamming.191 Orbital jamming involves beaming a conflicting signal to-
ward a satellite. The original signal is drowned out by the jamming signal so 
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the original signal does not reach the satellite and cannot be rebroadcast to 
users. When this occurs, the original signal is overridden and disrupted for 
users everywhere,192 which can impact a large number of users because sat-
ellites operate in groups of channels.193 When one signal is disrupted, all 
signals in the same group can be affected, thereby cutting off services to all 
users in the satellite’s footprint, which can cover multiple continents.194 
Captain Midnight used uplink orbital jamming to disrupt all HBO service, 
the impact of which was felt all over the eastern United States.  
Terrestrial jamming occurs at a specific place on the Earth near the tar-
geted receiving station and involves using equipment that is easy to pur-
chase, use and conceal.195 Rather than targeting the satellite, terrestrial 
jamming targets specific terrestrial users.196 Thus, whereas orbital jamming 
effects can extend throughout a satellite’s entire footprint, terrestrial jam-
ming effects can be localized and limited to specific targets.197  
Known as a type of electronic decoy, 198 spoofing is similar to jamming. 
Instead of drowning out the real signal, a usable but false signal is emitted 
that mimics the characteristics of a true signal so the user receives a fake 
(or spoofed) signal.199 The goal of spoofing is to fool or mislead the end 
user by providing fake signals. The downing of the U.S. military drone in 
2011 by Iran, discussed previously, is believed to have been caused by a 
spoofing attack.200  
In the case of either jamming or spoofing, the jammer must operate in 
the same radio frequency bands as the system being jammed.201 The jam-
mer must locate via radar or signal tracking systems202 the signals to be 
jammed, and produce a similar signal with sufficient intensity to overwhelm 
the targeted signal(s).203 A jammer does not have to be located near the re-
ceiver to produce a signal nor need to know the location of the receiver to 
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be jammed.204 The jammer must only be located within the satellite’s foot-
print or broadcasting area and have the ability to direct its signal to the re-
ceiver.205 Thus, as long as the jamming activity is within the footprint of the 
satellite, which can span multiple countries, the jammer will not necessarily 
physically violate the territorial integrity of another State to effectuate a dis-
ruption. While most interference takes place on Earth with ground-based 
jammers, jammers can be placed in orbit on a satellite.206 Space-based jam-
mers however, are impractical because, in order to be effective, a large 
number of orbiting jammers would be needed.207  
 
2. The Ease of Intentional Interference 
 
Technically speaking, interfering with a satellite is easy, inexpensive and can 
be accomplished by using commercially available equipment. Anyone with 
commercial satellite communications equipment can jam satellite commu-
nications.208 For just a few thousand U.S. dollars, commercial companies 
are selling compact, well-disguised, weatherproofed jamming antennas that 
can disrupt satellite signals over a radius of five to twenty kilometers, de-
pending on terrain.209 Even hand-held jammers are now available and can 
deny radio signals up to eighty kilometers away.210 Thus, not only have ad-
vancements in technologies made jamming easier and less expensive to 
employ, the mobile nature of equipment has made it more difficult for sat-
ellite operators to track and locate the origin of jamming activities. In fact, 
while some countries like the United States recently passed new laws pro-
hibiting the marketing, sale and use of jamming devices,211 jamming devices 
remain widely available in other countries and on-line.212 An Internet search 
on the phrase “how to jam a signal” or “satellite signal jamming” results in 
pages of videos, tutorials, demonstrations and blogs detailing the ease in 
which one can obtain jamming equipment and disrupt almost any signal.  
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3. The Vulnerability of Commercial Communication Satellites and 
Signals 
 
All military and commercial satellite communications systems are suscepti-
ble to intentional interference, uplink and downlink jamming and spoofing. 
Whereas military satellites encrypt and encode satellite signals before 
transmitting them, most commercial communication satellites do not. Con-
sequently, commercial communication satellite signals are more susceptible 
to interference and jamming than military satellites and signals.213  
Commercial communication satellites are susceptible to jamming for a 
number of reasons. First, the cost and weight of countermeasures is con-
sidered an unnecessary expense.214 Second, commercial communication 
satellites are designed for ease of use and to send and receive signals over 
large areas.215 Third, most commercial communication satellites are easy to 
locate because they remain “stationary” over a particular location above 
Earth’s surface at all times.  
Most commercial communication satellites are located in GEO.216 The 
GEO orbit lies 35,786 kilometers/22,236 miles directly in the plane above 
the equator and remains fixed relative to Earth’s surface so satellites locat-
ed in the GEO orbit rotate at the same speed as Earth.217 Thus, because 
satellites in GEO are essentially located in the same position relative to a 
point on Earth at the same time every day, they are relatively easy to track 
and locate,218 and there is a large area from which it is possible to jam or 
spoof a signal.219  
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Some Russian commercial communication satellites operate in the 
Molniya Orbit, a highly elliptical orbit,220 because much of Russia is too far 
north to fall within the footprint of a satellite located in GEO.221 Other 
commercial communication satellites, such as the Globalstar satellite phone 
system, use a constellation of forty-eight satellites positioned in LEO.222 
Because LEO satellites are much closer to the Earth’s surface than those in 
GEO (satellites in LEO are located between 65–310 miles/100–500 kilo-
meters above the surface),223 LEO satellites and their communications are 
very susceptible to jamming attacks and attacks from Earth-based kinetic 
weapons.224  
 
C. Legal Frameworks Governing Satellites and Intentional Interference 
 
1. International Telecommunications Law 
 
The UN technical agency in charge of international coordination for in-
formation and telecommunications technologies is the International Tele-
communications Union. The ITU defines telecommunications as, “[a]ny 
transmission, emission or reception of signs, signals, writings, images and 
sounds or intelligence of any nature by wire, radio, optical or other elec-
tromagnetic systems.”225 Initially founded in 1865 as the International Tele-
graph Union, the ITU became a UN specialized agency in 1947.226 Current-
ly, 193 countries and over seven hundred private-sector entities and aca-
demic institutions are members.227  
The ITU has numerous functions relating to satellites and telecommu-
nications. Specifically, the ITU coordinates and allocates the global radio 
spectrum used by satellites for different services and parties, assigns orbital 
slots to satellites stationed in the GEO orbit and prohibits intentional in-
terference with satellite signals on the basis of reciprocity.228 The ITU also 
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develops worldwide technical standards for the use, assignment and alloca-
tion of radio frequencies.229 The allocations and technical standards are 
codified in the ITU Constitution, the ITU Convention and the ITU Radio 
Regulations. In short, the ITU is the single leading international entity that, 
through mutual cooperation, ensures global communications run smoothly 
by organizing, managing and coordinating radio signals used by different 
services and providers.  
When the ITU assigns or allocates a specific radio signal, that signal as-
signment is recorded in a registry of radio frequency assignments under the 
Master International Frequency Register (MIFR).230 Registering a signal on 
the MIFR gives the assigned user a right to “international recognition”231 
and protection against interference. If another user uses the same signal 
and thus interferes with the recognized holder of the allocated signal, the 
interfering user must, upon notification, immediately cease using that fre-
quency if that use creates harmful interference with the signal that has in-
ternational recognition.232  
“Harmful interference” is defined by the ITU as interference with a radio sig-
nal that endangers the functioning of a radio service “or seriously degrades, ob-
structs or repeatedly interrupts a radio communication service operating in ac-
cordance with ITU Radio Regulations.”233 All ITU member States are obligated 
not to cause harmful interference, and enforce and respect the ITU regulatory 
regime.234 To this effect, Article 6.1 of the ITU Constitution provides: “The 
Member States are bound to abide by the provisions of this Constitution, the 
Convention and the Administrative Regulations in all telecommunications office 
and stations established or operated by them which engage in international ser-
vices or which are capable of causing harmful interference to radio services of 
other countries . . . .”235 
Article 45 of the ITU Constitution also prohibits harmful interference. 
It states: 
 
All Stations, whatever their purpose, must be established and operated in 
such a manner as not to cause harmful interference to the radio services 
or communications of other Member States or of recognized operating 
agencies, or of other duly authorized operating agencies which carry on a 
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radio service, and which operate in accordance with the provisions of the 
Radio Regulations. 
 
Similarly, ITU member States must not use an unnecessary transmis-
sion of power causing harmful interference. Specifically, Article 15 of the 
ITU Radio Regulations provides: 
 
All Stations are forbidden to carry out unnecessary transmissions, or the 
transmission of superfluous signals, or the transmission of false or mis-
leading signals, or the transmission of signals without identification . . . .236 
Transmitting stations shall radiate only as much power as is necessary to 
ensure a satisfactory service.237 
 
Accordingly, any interference with, or intentional jamming of, a signal is 
contrary to the ITU regulatory regime. Such an act not only violates the 
principle of international recognition under the ITU Radio Regulations, it 
also interferes with another user’s right under Article 6 and Article 45 of 
the ITU Constitution, and represents an unnecessary transmission of pow-
er in violation of Article 15 of the ITU Constitution.  
If satellite signal interference or jamming occurs, member States are 
obligated to comply with ITU provisions and cooperate with others to 
eliminate harmful interference238 through bilateral negotiations.239 If negoti-
ations fail, the affected State may attempt arbitration as specified under Ar-
ticle 41 of the ITU Convention or seek dispute resolution pursuant to Arti-
cle 56. However, neither Article 41 nor Article 56 has ever been used.240 
Historically, compliance with ITU provisions, utmost goodwill and mu-
tual cooperation resolved most interference issues.241 States observed the 
ITU’s rules and regulations voluntarily and out of self-interest. Voluntary 
compliance however, is increasingly proving to be insufficient. Jamming 
continues despite calls for its elimination by ITU member States and inter-
national organizations, and responsible member States often fail to 
acknowledge the interference. Not only is the problem of interference 
largely political,242 but also there are no compulsory international dispute 
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resolution systems within the ITU legal regime to resolve interference 
problems.243 Additionally, not all nations have ratified all of the ITU rules 
and regulations, and the ITU does not have any mechanism of enforce-
ment power, nor does it have the authority to impose sanctions against 
those States violating the ITU regulatory regime.244 Thus, despite the ITU’s 
efforts to resolve the growing problem of interference, persuasion, negotia-
tions and voluntary compliance have long been the only tools available to 
prevent intentional interference.245 
Over the course of the past few years, however, the ITU has taken a 
stronger stance against satellite interference and jamming. For example, in 
2010, the ITU issued its first public exhortation to a State (Iran) to stop 
jamming originating within its borders.246 At the 2012 World Radiocom-
munication Conference (WRC),247 the ITU took another public step in 
condemning intentional interference by amending portions of the ITU 
Constitution and Radio Regulations.248 The changes, albeit insignificant, 
declare violations of Article 45 of the ITU Constitution and Article 15.1 of 
the Radio Regulations as acts requiring necessary actions by national ad-
ministrations. Of the 193 member States, 165 approved the change to Arti-
cle 45, which states: “If an administration has information of an infringe-
ment of the Constitution, the Convention or the Radio Regulations (in par-
ticular Article 45 of the Constitution and No. 15.1 of the Radio Regula-
tions) committed by a station, under its jurisdiction, the administration 
shall ascertain the facts and take the necessary actions.”249 
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Unfortunately, the change did not increase the ITU’s authority nor did 
it contemplate any future action when member States fail to take “neces-
sary actions.” Article 45 merely rephrases the original regulation with some 
clarification as to the types of infringement contemplated. Consequently, 
many problems remain with respect to preventing interference.  
Notwithstanding the general obligation of non-interference, Articles 34 
and 35 of the ITU Constitution permit member States to suspend or pre-
vent incoming and outgoing satellite communications within their own ter-
ritory. Article 34 provides: 
 
Member States reserve the right to stop, in accordance with their national 
law, the transmission of any private telegram which may appear danger-
ous to the security of the State or contrary to its laws, to public order or 
to decency, provided that they immediately notify the office of origin of 
the stoppage . . . .250 Member States also reserve the right to cut off, in ac-
cordance with their national law, any other private telecommunication 
which may appear dangerous to the security of the State or contrary to its 
laws, to public order or to decency.251 
 
Similarly, Article 35 states: “Each Member State reserves the right to 
suspend the international telecommunication service, either generally or 
only for certain relations and/or for certain kinds of correspondence, 
outgoing, incoming or in transit, provided that it immediately notifies 
such action to each of the other Member States . . . .”252 This authority 
derives from every State’s capacity as a sovereign to control information 
within its own territory, but does not permit States to interfere with 
communications beyond its borders.253 In fact, under Article 38 of the 
ITU Constitution, member States are obligated to ensure the best tech-
nical conditions for rapid, uninterrupted international telecommunica-
tions and refrain from disrupting operations in other States.254 Regardless, 
a properly executed disruption of satellite transmissions fitting within the 
Article 34 and 35 exemptions would not violate the ITU regulatory re-
gime. However, because neither Article 34 nor Article 35 specifies the 
source or destination of stopped or “cut off” communications, there is 
some ambiguity as to the scope of the exemption. For example, it is un-
                                                                                                                      
250. ITU Constitution, supra note 23, art. 34(1). 
251. Id., art. 34(2). 
252. Id., art. 35. 
253. Housen-Couriel, supra note 2, at 445.  
254. ITU Constitution, supra note 23, art. 38. 
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clear whether communications completely within a foreign country or 
between locations in two foreign countries would be included under these 
exemptions where a State could establish a basis for jurisdiction other 
than territoriality, such as communications to or from an embassy.255 
Moreover, Article 48 of the ITU Constitution carves out an exception 
for the military. It provides, in part: “Member States retain their entire 
freedom with regard to military radio installations. Nevertheless, these in-
stallations must, so far as possible, observe statutory provision relative . . . 
to the measures to be taken to prevent harmful interference . . . .”256 Article 
48 exempts national defense services from ITU rules and regulations, but 
in doing so makes resolution of harmful interference incidents involving 
the military difficult. In fact, the words “so far as possible” appear only to 
require military installations to exercise “due regard.” Article 48 also leaves 
open the question of whether military use of commercial satellites falls out-
side the ITU regulatory framework.257 Regardless of how Article 48 impacts 
the use of commercial satellites, the terms “entire freedom” and “so far as 
possible” clearly suggest military exigency or necessity (such as measures 
taken in armed conflict) may supersede the obligation to prevent harmful 
interference.258 In armed conflict, the ITU regime would not govern all acts 
of harmful interference. Measures involving interference would be gov-
erned by the jus ad bellum and jus in bello as discussed below.  
The impact of the ITU regime on satellite signal interference during 
armed conflict, aside from Article 48 discussions above, will not be dis-
cussed in greater detail since historical practice suggests treaties incon-
sistent with a state of armed conflict are usually suspended259 between bel-
ligerents during armed conflicts.260 Regardless, ITU treaty obligations be-
                                                                                                                      
255. Roger D. Scott, Legal Aspects of Information Warfare: Military Disruption of Telecommu-
nications, 45 NAVAL LAW REVIEW 57, 63–64 (1998). 
256. ITU Constitution, supra note 23, art. 48. 
257. Scott, supra note 255, at 63–64. 
258. Jarman, supra note 60, at 41. 
259. While treaty obligations between belligerents during armed conflict were histori-
cally suspended, the applicability and compatibility of some treaties to a state of armed 
conflict between belligerents is assessed on a case-by-case basis in order to determine 
whether the object and purpose of particular provisions are consistent with a state of hos-
tilities. 1 DANIEL P. O’CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 268 (2d ed. 1970). 
260. LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 302 (H. Lauterpacht 
ed., 7th ed. 1952). 
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tween belligerents and non-belligerents (neutrals) would continue in armed 
conflict under the law of neutrality.261 
As the above discussion demonstrates, there are exceptions and ambi-
guities regarding the application and scope of the ITU framework to harm-
ful interference. The ITU framework has also had little ability to prevent 
intentional disruption of satellite communications and a failure to comply 
with ITU provisions may only constitute a breach of contractual obliga-
tions 262 giving rise to State responsibility.263 While an exhaustive discussion 
on State responsibility is outside the scope of this article, it is important to 
emphasize that a breach of international obligation attributable to a State is 
an internationally wrongful act,264 thereby triggering a secondary obligation 
to cease the unlawful conduct and re-establish the status quo ante by way of 
restitution,265 compensation266 or satisfaction.267 Moreover, if the ensuing 
dispute cannot be resolved, an injured State can always bring the matter 
before the UN Security Council or the UN General Assembly for investi-
gation.268 As noted above, however, States have yet to pursue such courses 
of action. This lack of action could be because States want to avoid draw-
ing attention to vulnerable systems or because States don’t want to call out 
others for activities they too engage in against others. 
 
2. International Space Law 
 
In addition to the ITU framework, international space law also governs 
activities of satellites and satellite communications. Initiated in the 1950s, 
ISL was formally codified in the 1960s and 1970s as a result of the launch 
                                                                                                                      
261. For a thorough discussion on how the law of neutrality applies to satellites and 
outer space, see Jarman, supra note 60. 
262. STEPHEN GOROVE, DEVELOPMENTS IN SPACE LAW: ISSUES AND POLICIES 49 
(1991). 
263. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts art. 
2, Rep. of the Int'l L. Comm'n, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/56/10, GAOR 56th Sess., Supp. 
No. 10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMIS-
SION 32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter State 
Responsibility]. 
264. Id., art. 2. 
265. Id., art. 35.  
266. Id., art. 36. 
267. Id., art. 37. 
268. U.N. Charter art. 35. 
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of Sputnik I,269 the world’s first artificial satellite.270 Today, the fundamental 
norms applicable to outer space are found in five treaties271 and several 
non-binding principles and declarations.272 Together, these documents es-
tablish the primary principles, rules and legal system for all activities con-
ducted in outer space.  
                                                                                                                      
269. Sputnik means, “fellow traveler.” John N. Wilford, With Fear and Wonder in Its 
Wake, Sputnik Lifted Us Into the Future, NEW YORK TIMES (Sept. 25, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/learning/teachers/featured_articles/20070925tuesday.html. 
Even though the Soviet Union notified the international community of its plan to launch a 
satellite prior to actually doing so, Sputnik I grabbed the attention of the world and caught 
Americans completely off-guard. It also shocked the U.S. government due to its military 
implications. With no function but to chirp at a predetermined frequency, Sputnik I re-
vealed the Soviet Union not only had the ability to launch a rocket into outer space, but, 
more importantly, it demonstrated that the Soviets could advance that technology to pro-
duce a rocket with enough thrust to launch an inter-continental ballistic missile armed 
with a nuclear warhead at a target within the United States. In fact, Sputnik was even seen 
by some as a “Sword of Damocles” dangling overhead. See Sputnik and The Dawn of the 
Space Age, NASA, www.history.nasa.gov/sputnik (last visited Feb.11, 2014); A Brief History 
of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA, http://www.hq.nasa.gov 
/office/pao/History/40thann/factsheet.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2014); Neil de Grasse 
Tyson, The Case for Space: Why We Should Keep Reaching for the Stars, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 
Mar./Apr. 2012, at 22; JOHN W. MASON, THE COLD WAR, 1945–1991, at 29 (2009); 
MCDOUGAL, LASSWELL & VLASIC, supra note 18, at 283. 
270. Sputnik was an aluminum sphere the size of a beach ball (twenty-two inches). It 
weighed 183.9 pounds and orbited Earth in approximately ninety-eight minutes. Sputnik 
had four spring-loaded whip antennae and carried a small radio beacon that chirped at 
regular intervals on a predetermined radio frequency. Its exact location over Earth’s sur-
face could be verified by means of telemetry. Sputnik and The Dawn of the Space Age, supra 
note 269. 
271. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 19 
U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]; The Agreement on the 
Rescue of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched in Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 
19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119; Convention on International Liability for Damage 
Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter 
Liability Convention]; Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 
Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration Convention]; 
Agreement governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 
Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3. 
272. Question of the Peaceful Use of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1348 (XIII), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/1348 (III) (Dec. 13, 1958); Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activi-
ties of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, G.A. Res 1962 (XVII), U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/1962 (XVII) (Dec. 13, 1963). 
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All major spacefaring nations are State parties to most of the ISL trea-
ties, including the Outer Space Treaty, the Liability Convention, the Regis-
tration Convention, and the Return and Rescue Agreement. Participation in 
the Moon Agreement, however, remains low, with only fifteen State parties 
to date.273 Because not all five treaties or provisions therein are relevant to 
satellite signal interference, this article will only address those treaties and 
provisions most relevant to satellites, satellite communications and satellite 
signal interference. 
The Outer Space Treaty is one of the primary legal instruments govern-
ing space activities and represents the international community’s first step 
in proscribing norms to an area without law.274 Often referred to as the 
“Constitution,” the “Bible” or “Magna Carta” of space law,275 the Outer 
Space Treaty has been in force since October 10, 1967 and has been rati-
fied by 102 States and signed by another twenty-six States.276 It provides 
the basic framework for international space law, contains numerous princi-
ples that have passed into customary law277 and applies to all activities con-
ducted in outer space, regardless of actor. It also reaffirmed the duty of 
States to comply with international law278 while conducting outer space ac-
tivities.279  
Article III of the Outer Space Treaty dictates that all State parties must 
undertake outer space activities “in accordance with international law, in-
cluding the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining 
international peace and security and promotion international cooperation 
and understanding.”280 State parties engaged in any outer space activity are 
                                                                                                                      
273. Status of International Agreements Relating to Activities in Outer Space,” UNITED NA-
TIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/en 
/SpaceLaw/treatystatus/index.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2014). 
274. Michael C. Mineiro, FY-1C and USA-193 ASAT Intercepts: An Assessment of Legal 
Obligations under Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, 34 JOURNAL OF SPACE LAW 321, 325 
(2008). 
275. LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 43, at 53. 
276. Status of International Agreements Relating to Activities in Outer Space, supra note 273.  
277. LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 43, at 41. 
278. Under Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ, international law includes treaties and 
international conventions, international custom and general principles of law as recognized 
by civilized nations, as well as judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly quali-
fied publicists as subsidiary means for the determination of rules and law. Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter 
Statute of the ICJ]. 
279. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 271, art. III. 
280. Id. 
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therefore obliged to respect not only the rights and obligations established 
by the Outer Space Treaty, but also the rights and obligations contained in 
the ITU and the UN Charter, as well as general principles of international 
law.  
Article I of the Outer Space Treaty codifies one of the most significant 
and well recognized principles of international space law: the freedom of 
exploration and use of outer space by all States.281 As it relates to this arti-
cle, Article I allows States to utilize satellites and engage in satellite com-
munications without prior authorization from other States.282 Article I also 
establishes the “common interest” principle, which provides space shall be 
used for the benefit and in the interests of all mankind.283 In full, Article I 
requires States to balance their outer space activities and national interests 
with the wider benefit and interest of the international community. 
Although Article I requires States to contemplate the ramifications of 
their outer space activities and the impact of those actions on all countries, 
it does not explicitly prohibit anyone or any State from engaging in a spe-
cific space activity, including interfering with satellite signals. Thus, Article 
I does not answer the question of when jamming is permissible. One thing 
is clear, however, under the Outer Space Treaty, States bear international 
responsibility for actions committed contrary to international obligations.284  
Article II of the Outer Space Treaty creates a borderless regime in out-
er space285 by prohibiting States and private entities from making any claim 
of sovereignty over the moon, any celestial body and any expanse of outer 
space, including orbital slots occupied by satellites.286 Article II provides, 
“[o]uter space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject 
to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or oc-
cupation, or by any other means.”287 Thus, despite the freedom of explora-
tion and use of outer space as codified within Article I of the Outer Space 
                                                                                                                      
281. Id., art. I(2). 
282. Schmitt, Military Operations in Space, supra note 51, at 101. 
283. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 271, art. I(1). 
284. Phosphates in Morocco (Italy v. Fr.), Preliminary Objections, 1938 P.C.I.J. (ser. 
A/B) No. 74, at 10, 28; see also S.S. Wimbleton (U.K. v. Ger.), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1, 
at 15, 30; Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), Jurisdiction, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 
21. 
285. Michel Bourbonniére, The Clausewitz Nebulae: The Legitimacy of Military Activities in 
Outer Space During Armed Conflicts, 40 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 243, 250 
(2010) [hereinafter Bourbonniére, Clausewitz Nebulae]. 
286. Id. at 251–52. 
287. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 271, art. II. 
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Treaty, Article II establishes that any exercise of that freedom, wherever 
located and in whatever form, may never create the basis of sovereignty 
and ownership.288   
Bearing in mind the ITU provisions discussed above regarding the as-
signment of orbital positions and the allocation of radio frequencies, satel-
lite activities may appear to contradict Article II of the Outer Space Treaty. 
For example, satellites occupy (and assert exclusive use and occupation of) 
specific orbits as assigned by the ITU. Additionally, satellite transmissions 
are provided protection against interference when registered with the ITU. 
These actions, however, do not give rise to claims of sovereignty or owner-
ship. Satellite owners and operators are merely exercising specific rights 
extended to them under the ITU regime as agreed to and as respected by 
State parties of the ITU.289 Satellite orbital slots are also sold,290 traded and 
leased.291 While such activities may again appear to contravene the non-
appropriation principle as set forth in Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, 
in actuality they do not because the object at issue is the not the physical 
location in space where the satellite is positioned nor the specific radio fre-
quency, but rather the right of use as determined under the ITU frame-
work. Finally, even with Article II’s prohibition of claims of sovereignty in 
outer space, States retain sovereignty and control over satellites and other 
objects they launch into space, including those launched by their nation-
als.292  
Article II does not explicitly address the activities of private or non- 
State entities. However, the extension of the “non-appropriation principle” 
to non-State entities is “firmly established in space law,”293 and is set forth 
in Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, which provides: 
                                                                                                                      
288. For a good discussion on whether Article II also prohibits the creation of private 
property rights on celestial bodies, see Ricky J. Lee, Article II of the Outer Space Treaty: Prohi-
bition of State Sovereignty, Private Property Rights, or Both?, 11 AUSTRALIAN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW JOURNAL 128 (2004). 
289. Radio spectrum frequency and orbital positions are recognized as limited natural 
international resources that are to be used economically and efficiently so all States have 
equitable access to them. See ITU Constitution, supra note 23, art. 44(2). 
290. NBN Co Closes in on Satellite Slots, TALK SATELLITE—ASIA PACIFIC (Apr. 8, 
2013), http://www.talksatellite.com/Asia-A101283.htm.  
291. SAMUEL BLACK, NO HARMFUL INTERFERENCE WITH SPACE OBJECTS: THE KEY 
TO CONFIDENCE BUILDING (2008), available at http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads 
/research-pdfs/NHI_Final.pdf. 
292. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 271, art. VI. 
293. Lee, supra note 288, at 129. 
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States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for na-
tional activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial 
bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or 
by non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are 
carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present 
Treaty. The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, includ-
ing the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and 
continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty. 
 
Article VI requires the appropriate State to authorize and continually 
supervise space activities of State and non-State entities, making any act of 
appropriation taking place under the State’s influence, supervision or direc-
tion a violation of Article II.294 Article VI also holds States internationally 
responsible for space activities of both State and non-State entities, includ-
ing all activities involving satellites and satellite communications. This 
means States not only have a duty to actively manage and supervise the sat-
ellite communications of both State and non-State entities, but also States 
must not allow such entities to act contrary to the rights of others States,295 
including engaging in satellite signal interference in violation of the ITU 
regime. 
Insofar as supervision, authority and control are concerned, Article 
VIII of the Outer Space Treaty further ties activities of non-State entities 
to State parties. According to Article VIII, the State on whose registry an 
object is launched into space must retain jurisdiction and control over such 
object while in outer space.296 Ownership of such an object is not changed 
by its presence in outer space.297 Under the Registration Convention, which 
establishes the link between State and spacecraft,298 a “launching State” (de-
fined as the State that either launches or procures the launch of a space ob-
ject, or a State from whose territory or facility an object is launched)299 
must register the object in its domestic registry and with the United Na-
                                                                                                                      
294. Id. 
295. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 271, art. VI; Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 
I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9).  
296. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 271, art. VIII. 
297. Id., art. VIII. 
298. I.H. Ph. Diederiks-Verschoor, Registration of Spacecraft, in NEW FRONTIERS IN 
SPACE LAW 125 (Edward McWhinney & Martin A Bradley eds., 1969). 
299. Registration Convention, supra note 271, art. I. 
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tions.300 Collectively, Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty and the Regis-
tration Convention permanently tie the State of registry to a launched ob-
ject, as well as establish the link between registration, legal responsibility 
and liability under Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty.  
Article VII holds States financially liable for any damages caused by ob-
jects launched into space. Specifically, Article VII provides that States 
launching or procuring the launching of an object into space are “interna-
tionally liable for damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natu-
ral or juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, 
in air space or in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bod-
ies.”301 Read in conjunction with Articles VI and VIII of the Outer Space 
Treaty, Article VII imposes financial liability on launching States whenever 
damage is caused on Earth, in airspace or in outer space by objects 
launched into outer space by State, non-State, private and commercial enti-
ties. Article VII, however, is limited in both scope and application; it ap-
plies only to physical damage302 caused by objects launched into outer space. 
Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty does not apply to non-physical dam-
age or to physical damage not caused by an “object,” an object being “some-
thing that can be seen or touched.”303 Article VII would also not apply to 
objects never launched into space, such as terrestrial jammers.  
Applying this analysis to satellite signal interference, Article VII may 
then only apply in situations where interference is generated by a satellite 
(or other object launched into outer space) and when those activities actually 
result in physical damage. As testimony before the 1967 U.S. Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on the Outer Space Treaty reveals, the United States 
believed Article VII liability did not apply to “damages of an electronic na-
ture in outer space with respect to radio and ray and various electronic 
                                                                                                                      
300. Id., art. II. 
301. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 271, art. VII. 
302. In fact, U.S. Senate hearings on the Outer Space Treaty indicate that liability un-
der Article VII, “has never been viewed by any state participating in [U.N.] discussions . . . 
[to go] beyond physical damage.” See Treaty of Outer Space, Hearings before S. Comm. on Foreign 
Relations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 70–72 (1967) (testimony of U.S. Ambassador Arthur Gold-
berg).  
303. Object, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/object. Applying an ordinary and plain meaning to the term “ob-
ject” is the general rule for treaty interpretation. See Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT] (“a treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”). 
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communications.”304 While the U.S. opinion does not dictate what drafters 
of Article VII contemplated, it may indicate how the United States might 
frame responses to any claims made against it for damages involving satel-
lite signal interference. 
Article VII also fails to address causal links required between the object 
and resulting physical damage, i.e., whether indirect physical damages are 
covered under Article VII. For example, if satellite A were to jam satellite B 
causing satellite B to collide with satellite C, would the launching State of 
satellite A be liable for damages to the launching States of both B and C? 
Article VII fails to address such a scenario. 
The Liability Convention, promulgated to elaborate on liability for 
damages caused by space objects as set forth in the Outer Space Treaty,305 
defines damage as “loss of life, personal injury or other impairment of 
health; or loss of or damage to property of States or of persons, natural or 
juridical, or property of international intergovernmental organizations.”306 
The Liability Convention imposes liability only when damage is physically 
caused by a space object in a crash, explosion or other direct harm.307 As-
suming jamming effects and spoofing activities remain limited to tempo-
rary disruptions and/or indirect damages (such as “consequential” eco-
nomic losses), the Liability Convention does not appear to apply to satellite 
signal interference. Additionally, because satellite signal interference and 
radio frequency spectrum are not “objects” or “space objects,” an argu-
ment can also be made that the Liability Convention, like Article VII, is 
inapplicable when interference emits from Earth-based stations. However, 
because Article VII and the Liability Convention have never been asserted 
as a basis for damages resulting from satellite signal interference, it is diffi-
cult to discern the actual scope or extent of eithers’ reach.308 
Setting the above uncertainty aside, ISL does not completely supersede 
general principles of liability under international law. As previously noted, 
international law is explicitly referenced and incorporated into ISL under 
Article III of the Outer Space Treaty. Thus, even though the Outer Space 
                                                                                                                      
304. See Treaty of Outer Space, Hearings before S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 
1st Sess. 71 (1967) (testimony of U.S. Senator Albert Gore).  
305. Liability Convention, supra note 271, pmbl. 
306. Id., art. I. 
307. CARL Q. CHRISTOL, SPACE LAW: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 219–20 (1991). 
308. Under Article 31 (b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, treaty in-
terpretation shall take into account, “any subsequent practice in the application of the 
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.” VCLT, 
supra note 303. 
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Treaty and the Liability Convention do not clearly address financial recov-
ery for the full range of damages resulting from satellite signal interference, 
a State remains liable under international law if it breaches any international 
obligation.309 As addressed above, all ITU member States are obligated not 
to cause harmful interference and to enforce and respect the ITU regulato-
ry regime. Moreover, as recognized in the Corfu Channel and Trail Smelter 
Arbitration Tribunal decisions, a State has an obligation “not to allow its ter-
ritory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.”310 Finally, 
in the Chorzow Factory case, the Permanent Court of International Justice 
laid down the principle that a State committing an unlawful act must make 
reparation for the damage caused.311 Thus, even though ISL may not cover 
liability for satellite signal interference, States retain the duty “to protect 
other States against injurious acts by individuals from within their jurisdic-
tion.”312 A similar principle is found in Article IX of the Outer Space Trea-
ty.  
Article IX declares, “State Parties . . . shall be guided by the principle of 
cooperation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in 
outer space . . . with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other 
State Parties to the Treaty. . . .” Article IX further provides, in relevant 
part:  
 
If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or ex-
periment planned by it or its nationals in outer space . . . would cause po-
tentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in the 
peaceful exploration and use of outer space, . . . it shall undertake appro-
priate international consultations before proceeding with any such activity 
or experiment. A State Party to the Treaty which has reason to believe 
that an activity or experiment planned by another State Party in outer 
space . . . would cause potentially harmful interference with activities in 
the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, . . . may request consulta-
tion concerning the activity or experiment. 
 
                                                                                                                      
309. BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 226 (1953). 
310. Corfu Channel, supra note 295, at 23; Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1907 
(1938). 
311. Factory at Chorzow, supra note 284, at 21. 
312. Trail Smelter, supra note 310. 
 
 
 
 International Law Studies 2014 
148 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interpreted in an ordinary and plain meaning and read in the context of 
the Outer Space Treaty,313 Article IX is an obligation on States to consider 
legal rights of other States, both prior to and during any ongoing activi-
ties.314 However, “States can disregard any anticipated impact on rights that 
do not correspond to peaceful use and exploration.”315 In placing an obliga-
tion on States to exercise “due regard,” Article IX imposes a consultation 
requirement on a State party if that State believes its activity would cause 
interference that is potentially harmful. 
To trigger the consultation requirement, three conditions must be satis-
fied: (1) an activity is planned by a State or its nationals; (2) the State has 
reason to believe the activity has the potential to cause interference that is 
harmful; and (3) the interference must potentially interfere with the activi-
ties of other States in their peaceful exploration and use of outer space.316 
The first condition reflects the link between a State and its nationals estab-
lished by Articles VI and VIII of the Outer Space Treaty, as well as under 
the Registration Convention. Under the second condition, the responsibil-
ity and authority to determine whether the activity at issue may cause po-
tentially harmful interference lies with the State planning the action. If a 
State “ha[s] knowledge that proves the assertion that a planned activity 
would cause potentially harmful interference,”317 the second condition is 
satisfied. The second condition requires the State to “know” the effect of 
its activity on other States, as well as a determination by the State of 
whether the activity’s effect qualifies as harmful interference as contem-
plated in Article IX and ISL. 
While the phrase “harmful interference” is defined under the ITU,318 it 
is not defined nor explicitly proscribed by the Outer Space Treaty. Howev-
er, when Article IX was negotiated, one motivating factor was the U.S.’s 
                                                                                                                      
313. The standard method of treaty interpretation, as adopted by the International 
Court of Justice, is articulated in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties. Article 31 states, “treaties shall be interpreted in good faith and in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose.” VCLT, supra note 303. 
314. Mineiro, supra note 274, at 334. 
315. Id. 
316. Id. at 334–35. 
317. Id. at 336. 
318. “Harmful interference” is defined as interference with a radio signal that endan-
gers the functioning of a radio service or seriously degrades, obstructs, or repeatedly inter-
rupts a radio communication service operating in accordance with ITU Radio Regulations. 
ITU Radio Regulations, supra note 190, art. 1.169. 
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Project West Ford, which studied the effects on global radio communica-
tions of dispersing a network of five hundred thousand tiny copper metal 
strips (dipoles) into a short-lived orbit.319 When the project became public, 
a community of international scientists and astronomers protested, voicing 
concerns the project would interfere with their studies on optical and radio 
astronomy, especially if the dipoles remained in orbit beyond their one- to 
two-year life cycle.320 The project was also condemned at the United Na-
tions by the Soviet Union and several other States.321 
In 1960, the Academy of Sciences studied the project effects and soon 
thereafter, the United States publically announced Project West Ford 
would be a short-term project. Specifically, the U.S. statement provided, in 
relevant part: 
 
No further launches of orbiting dipoles will be planned until after the re-
sults of the West Ford experiment have been analyzed and evaluated. . . . 
Any decision to place additional quantities of dipoles in orbit, subsequent 
to the West Ford experiment, will be contingent upon the results of the 
analysis and evaluation and the development of necessary safeguards 
against harmful interference with space activities or with any branch of 
science. Optical and radio astronomers throughout the world should be 
invited to cooperate in the West Ford experiment to ascertain the effects 
of the experimental belt in both the optical and the radio parts of the 
spectrum.322 
 
The U.S. pledge, however, failed to quell the International Astronomi-
cal Union (IAU) concerns, which issued a resolution “to all governments . . . 
launching space experiments which could possibly affect astronomical re-
search” to consult with the IAU before conducting such experiments.323 In 
response to these concerns, as well as Soviet Union condemnation of Pro-
ject West Ford, UN Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson announced:  
 
                                                                                                                      
319. Mineiro, supra note 274, at 337; Irwin I. Shapiro, Orbital Properties of the West Ford 
Dipole Belt, IEEE XPLORE, http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/freeabs_all.jsp?tp=& ar-
number=1444922&isnumber=31060 (last visited Feb. 11, 2014).  
320. DELBERT R. TERRILL JR., THE AIR FORCE ROLE IN DEVELOPING INTERNA-
TIONAL OUTER SPACE LAW 63 (1999). 
321. Kathleen Teltsch, 6 Soviet Space Failures Believed To Have Been Probes of Planets, NEW 
YORK TIMES, June 16, 1963, at A2. 
322. TERRILL, supra note 320, at 65. 
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The U.S. would conduct no more such experiments until the results of 
this one were fully analyzed, and in any case none without proper scien-
tific safeguards; The results of the experiment would be disclosed to in-
terested scientists of all nations; Prior consultations with scientists would 
precede any further activity of this nature; Advance notice of the launch-
ing of such experiments would be given in accordance with the procedure 
recommended by the General Assembly.324 
 
It is this precedent created by the United States that provided the basis for 
Article IX.325  
Today, harmful interference in outer space falls into three primary cat-
egories: (1) observational interference (terrestrial based astronomical ob-
servations or space based terrestrial observations); (2) radio frequency in-
terference (as defined by the ITU); and (3) physical interference (interfer-
ence with the freedom of movement and/or physical operations in outer 
space).326 Under this classification, interference with satellite signals may in 
fact qualify as potentially harmful interference. However, because harmful 
interference is understood more broadly under the Outer Space Treaty 
than under the definition adopted by the ITU, States have wide latitude in 
determining when their activities constitute harmful interference under the 
Outer Space Treaty and whether their activities trigger the duty to consult. 
Moreover, there has never been any consultation under the auspices of Ar-
ticle IX despite the fact States have questioned others about outer space 
activities deemed dangerous or potentially hazardous,327 and at least one 
State initiated international discussions despite declaring it had no Article 
                                                                                                                      
324. Norman Thorpe, The Process of Space Law Development 3 (unpublished paper deliv-
ered at Major Command Judge Advocate Conference, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington 
DC, Nov. 16, 1967), http://www.docstoc.com/docs/33978175/The-Air-Force-Role-in-
Developing-International-Outer-Space-Law. 
325. Id. 
326. Mineiro, supra note 274, at 337. 
327. The United States issued several demarches in response to China’s 2007 kinetic 
shoot down of its aging weather satellite, Feng-Yun-1C. Jeff Foust, WikiLeaks Cables on 
US-China ASAT Testing, SPACE POLITICS (Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.spacepolitics.com 
/2011/02/03/wikileaks-cables-on-us-china-asat-testing/. The United Kingdom stated it 
was concerned about the creation of debris generated and China’s lack of international 
consultation. Britain Concerned by Chinese Satellite Shoot-Down, SPACE WAR (Jan. 19, 2007), 
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Britain_Concerned_By_Chinese_Satellite_Shoot_Do
wn_999.html. Japan asked China for an explanation and stated nations “must use space 
peacefully.” Concern Over China’s Missile Test, BBC NEWS (Jan. 19, 2007), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6276543.stm. 
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IX obligation to do so.328 The absence of implementation in situations 
where Article IX may otherwise seem to apply suggests a possible emer-
gence of customary international law which could effectively amend the 
Outer Space Treaty by narrowly constraining the application of Article 
IX.329 Arguably, State practice seems to reflect a general understanding that 
some type of notification is expected even when activities do not trigger 
Article IX obligations. 
The third condition triggering a State’s obligation to undertake Article 
IX consultations requires the proposed activity (assuming it satisfies the 
threshold for the first and second conditions set forth above) to interfere 
with activities of other States in their peaceful exploration and use of outer 
space. This requires a determination as to whether other States’ activities 
meet the criteria for peaceful use and exploration.330 If such States’ activi-
ties are not peaceful, Article IX has not been triggered and there is no duty 
to undertake international consultations.331 
The term “peaceful purposes” is not defined in the Outer Space Treaty, 
but is referenced in its preamble. While some legal scholars assert “peace-
ful” means “non-military,”332 others suggest “peaceful” means “non-
aggressive” or “non-hostile.”333 Despite a long and historical disagreement 
over the meaning of “peaceful purposes,” most experts now agree the 
Outer Space Treaty does not prohibit military use of space.334 State prac-
                                                                                                                      
328. In 2008, prior to the U.S. shoot down of its satellite, USA-193, the United States 
openly declared it had no obligation under the Outer Space Treaty, Article IX, but none-
theless voluntarily notified other States of the planned action in the spirit of international 
cooperation. U.S. Department of Defense News Transcript, DoD News Briefing with 
Deputy National Security Advisor Jeffrey, General Cartwright and NASA Administrator 
Griffin (Feb. 14, 2008), http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcript 
id=4145. 
329. VCLT, supra note 303, art. 31(b). 
330. Mineiro, supra note 274, at 338. 
331. Id. 
332. BIN CHENG, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 520–22 (1997). 
333. Schmitt, Military Operations in Space, supra note 51, at 101. In 1962, U.S. Senator 
Albert Gore Sr., in comments made at the United Nations, stated that the U.S. view was 
that “outer space should be used only for peaceful purposes—that is non-aggressive and 
beneficial purposes.” International Space Treaties Travaux Preparatoires, U.N. GOAR, 17th 
Sess., 1289th Mtg, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1289 (1962). 
334. Ivan A. Vlasic, The Legal Aspects of Peaceful and Nonpeaceful Uses of Outer Space, in 
PEACEFUL AND NON-PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE, PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION FOR THE 
PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE 45, 45–47 (Bhupendra Jasani ed., 1991). 
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tice335 also supports the proposition that “peaceful” should be interpreted 
to mean “non-aggressive” or “non-hostile.”336 There has even been “con-
sensus, within the United Nations that ‘peaceful’ equates to ‘non-
aggressive.’”337 As will be further addressed below, the UN Resolution on 
the Definition of Aggression defines aggression as “the use of armed force 
by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independ-
ence of another state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter 
of the UN, as set out in this definition.”338  
In light of the above, “peaceful purposes” and “peaceful use and explo-
ration” should mean a State’s activity in outer space must not involve ag-
gressive behavior. That is, if a State’s activity amounts to aggression, an 
unlawful use of force or rises to the level of an armed attack, as contem-
plated under the UN Charter (and as will be explored in Section IV), there 
is no obligation on another State to undertake appropriate international 
consultations before interfering with that activity. In such a case, observa-
tional interference, radio frequency interference and physical interference 
affecting that non-peaceful activity would not violate ISL. Moreover, if Ar-
ticle IX was suspended between belligerents,339 a belligerent State would 
only be required to conduct appropriate international consultations with 
neutral parties under the law of neutrality, when applicable.340 However, 
                                                                                                                      
335. Pursuant to Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
treaty interpretation shall “take into account . . . any subsequent practice in the application 
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336. Richard A. Morgan, Military Use of Commercial Communication Satellites: A New Look 
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237, 303–9 (1994). 
337. Walter D. Reed & Robert B. Norris, Military Use of the Space Shuttle, 13 AKRON 
LAW REVIEW 665, 678 (1979); CHRISTOL, supra note 307, at 16. 
338. Definition of Aggression art. 1, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIV), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/3314 (XXIV) (Dec. 14, 1974). 
339. OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 302 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 
9th ed. 1992). 
340. The law of neutrality was formally established in 1907 by Hague Convention (V). 
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sons in Case of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310. As Article I provides that the 
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can be taken against a satellite or a signal of a neutral State. Hague V law did not contem-
plate satellites, satellite communications or even outer space activities. However, as several 
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because Article IX only imposes a duty to consult in good faith,341 and does 
not mandate that parties reach a mutually agreeable solution,342 consulta-
tions would solely depend on the nature and extent of the planned activi-
ty.343 Thus, if a belligerent deemed its outer space activity would not cause 
harmful interference to a neutral party, Article IX consultations would not 
be triggered.  
The final point of discussion on Article IX involves the meaning of 
“appropriate international consultations.” The Outer Space Treaty does not 
identify any procedure for “appropriate international consultations” nor 
does it designate an agency or international body with which States should 
consult in evaluating their activities.344 At a minimum, “appropriate interna-
tional consultations” requires States to provide affected States sufficient 
information to take appropriate action to avoid potentially harmful inter-
ference and to mitigate effects.345 It does not provide States any ability to 
limit, prevent or even prohibit another State from engaging in activities 
constituting harmful interference. Article IX only allows an affected State 
party the right to put forth a request for consultation, but the result of the 
consultation is not stipulated.346  
Regardless of the obligation to undertake “appropriate international 
consultations,” there have been no formal attempts by any State to hold 
another State responsible for a breach of that duty. Indeed, States have 
been vocal when it comes to outer space activities that have had the poten-
tial to be harmful, but States have rarely, if ever, gone so far as to declare 
such an activity is outright illegal. The reluctance to do so is likely tied to 
States’ desire to preserve a full range of activities in outer space in peace-
time, as well as during armed conflict. 
 The foregoing raises one additional provision under the Outer 
Space Treaty deserving brief discussion. Article IV relates to the militariza-
                                                                                                                      
and 9 relate to telegraph, telephone and wireless telegraphy, given their role in global trade 
and their purpose of mitigating the spread of armed conflict, “it is almost inconceivable 
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tion and weaponization of outer space. Specifically, Article IV provides as 
follows: 
 
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the 
Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weap-
ons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or sta-
tion such weapons in outer space in any other manner. The Moon and 
other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty ex-
clusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, in-
stallations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the 
conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The 
use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful 
purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility 
necessary for peaceful exploration of the Moon and other celestial bodies 
shall also not be prohibited. 
 
While this article will not go into detail in discussing Article IV there 
are some important considerations. First, even though there have been 
many discussions on the term “peaceful purposes,” the predominant opin-
ion, as already mentioned, is “peaceful” means “non-aggressive.”347 Second, 
treaty drafters deliberately and intentionally excluded conventional weap-
ons from the prohibition.348 Third, Article IV creates only a partial demili-
tarization of space, which is specifically applicable only during peacetime.349 
This assumes ISL treaty obligations between belligerents would be sus-
pended in a state of armed conflict. Finally, the Article IV ban focuses on 
nuclear weapons. Other weapons, such as conventional, biological, chemi-
cal and “exotic future weapons,” including laser beams, can be deployed 
without violating Article IV unless they can be classified as a weapon of 
mass destruction.350 
Jamming, which typically involves no direct physical damage, would 
not cause mass destruction in the same way as a nuclear weapon.351 Even if 
it did, the weapon of mass destruction might not be in space.352 For exam-
                                                                                                                      
347. CARL Q. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 5 
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ple, if a satellite is used to relay a jamming signal, the weapon of mass de-
struction (the initiator of the signal) may be located on Earth, and the satel-
lite is only a tool used to carry out the attack, just as satellites used for navi-
gation and guidance of intercontinental ballistic missiles would not be 
weapons of mass destruction.353 In such a case, this act would not violate 
Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty. 
As the above discussion reveals, in addition to the enforcement prob-
lems within the ITU regime, ISL too may not limit jamming, nor does it 
specifically protect States from intentional interference. Nevertheless, Arti-
cle III of the Outer Space Treaty brings in the full force and effect of the 
UN Charter and international law. Thus, even though the ITU and ISL of-
fer limited protection, intentional interference is not non liquet, or within a 
total legal vacuum. 
Because the UN Charter stipulates obligations under it override obliga-
tions under any other international agreement,354 the Outer Space Treaty is 
subject to the terms of the Charter and must be considered in the broader 
context of public international law.355 Therefore, the Outer Space Treaty 
does not modify any right or obligation within the UN Charter. Since the 
Charter addresses a State’s inherent right of self-defense,356 as long as a 
State is acting in self-defense its actions would not violate the Outer Space 
Treaty, assuming they otherwise comply with IHL, other provisions within 
the UN Charter and general principles of international law.  
 
D. The Principle of Non-Intervention 
 
In addition to violating ITU and ISL frameworks, satellite signal interfer-
ence may also constitute a breach of the non-intervention principle, an au-
tonomous principle of customary law.357 However, international law does 
not specifically address whether sovereignty exists in a satellite signal, and 
no State has ever claimed satellite signal interference violated its sovereign-
ty.  
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Non-intervention is the correlative of State sovereignty, a State’s inde-
pendence to exercise supreme authority over all people and things within 
its territory.358 In Corfu Channel, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) not-
ed, “[b]etween independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an 
essential foundation of international relations.”359 The principles of inde-
pendence and non-intervention are also recognized in Article 2(7) of the 
UN Charter, which provides: 
 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Na-
tions to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic ju-
risdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such mat-
ters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not 
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII. 
 
The significance of State sovereignty and non-intervention is further 
emphasized in the UN Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States.360 With a 
view towards maintaining international peace, the Declaration proclaims: 
 
No state . . . has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any rea-
son whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. Conse-
quently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or at-
tempted threats against the personality of the state or against its political, 
economic and cultural elements, are in violation of international law. 
 
Finally, in Nicaragua the ICJ noted the principle’s customary status and 
scope by stating non-intervention, “forbids all States or groups of States to 
intervene directly or indirectly in internal or external affairs of other 
States.”361 The Court also held: 
 
A prohibited intervention must . . . be one bearing on matters in which 
each State is permitted, by the principles of State Sovereignty, to decide 
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freely. One of these is the choice of political, economic, social and cultur-
al system, and the formulation of foreign policy. Intervention is wrongful 
when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices, which must 
remain free ones . . . the element of coercion . . . defines, and intended 
forms the very essence of prohibited intervention. 362  
 
An intervention is only wrongful when using methods of coercion.363 
Moreover, because the decisive test remains coercion,364 some academics 
believe “interference pure and simple is not intervention.”365 It then fol-
lows from this assertion, if there is no coercive element, there is no per se 
violation of the non-intervention principle.366 
In the context of satellite signal interference, a violation of the non-
intervention principle would exist if a broadcast signal was jammed and 
spoofed with coercive political messages for effecting a regime change or 
an election.367 Likewise, if jamming or spoofing were used to manipulate 
financial markets, it would constitute prohibited intervention. On the other 
hand, if jamming or spoofing was used to disrupt or prevent the broadcast 
of a television or news broadcast, but had no coercive element, the act may 
not violate the non-intervention principle.  
 
E. International Humanitarian Law  
 
Given the likelihood that satellite signal interference will assume a greater 
role in future armed conflicts, a question emerges as to whether the body 
of law regulating the conduct of armed conflict (jus in bello) or IHL368 can 
adequately protect civilians and civilian property from this new technical 
and military reality. As discussed above, because the military is so depend-
ent on unprotected commercial communication satellite systems, these du-
al-use objects have become increasingly vulnerable to disruptions by way of 
jamming and spoofing attacks. In addition, due to the interconnected na-
ture of civilian and military communication systems, it is almost impossible 
to differentiate between purely civilian systems and purely military systems, 
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or limit the effects of an attack to only military targets.369 Thus, satellite sig-
nal interference aimed at military communications during armed conflict 
will likely have an impact, perhaps even a severe impact, on civilian com-
munications that provide essential services to civilian, economic, State and 
other non-military entities. To illustrate an impact of satellite communica-
tion disruptions, one need only to consider the impacts of a 1996 incident 
involving a programming error with the GPS constellation. Six seconds 
after an erroneous time was accidentally entered into the system, over one 
hundred cellular networks were shutdown, taking hours and even days to 
recover.370 Given the extensive dependence on GPS signals by military, ci-
vilian and economic users, it is not hard to imagine the extent of such a 
disruption today.  
Even though there are no reported instances of intentional interference 
with commercial communication satellites during armed conflict causing 
devastating effects on civilian objects or the civilian population, it is possi-
ble. Indeed, most instances of satellite signal interference cause only tem-
porary and annoying disruptions. However, potential catastrophic scenari-
os, such as disruptions of critical financial infrastructures, collisions be-
tween aircraft or even losing communication capabilities with remotely pi-
loted aircraft carrying weapons could occur. For these reasons, it is im-
portant to examine how States may interpret IHL with regard to satellite 
signal interference and assess how IHL may be challenged by this emerging 
phenomenon. While a comprehensive discussion of IHL is well beyond the 
scope of this article, the basic sources of IHL and several primary princi-
ples will be briefly discussed to provide a basic understanding of implica-
tions emerging from interfering with commercial communication satellite 
signals during armed conflict.  
The principles of IHL have developed as a result of international 
agreement that armed conflict is subject to specific legal constraints and 
must be conducted in accordance with minimum international standards.371 
Initially rooted in customary law, IHL is now codified within a variety of 
rules and treaties, including the Hague and Geneva Conventions and the 
Additional Protocols of 1977.372 In simple terms, Hague treaties address the 
                                                                                                                      
369. Droege, supra note 112, at 7. 
370. Bruce Carlson, Protecting Global Utilities: Safeguarding the Next Millennium’s Space 
Based Public Services, AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL, Summer 2000, at 37, 38. 
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behavior of belligerents and the means and methods of warfare, including 
the lawfulness of weapons and targeting,373 whereas the Geneva Conven-
tions focus on protecting personnel involved in international armed con-
flicts, and addressing such issues as prisoners of war, civilians and wounded 
combatants.374  
Even though IHL frameworks do not specifically address satellite sig-
nal interference as a means or method of warfare, they do set forth legal 
boundaries with which all States are obliged to comply during any armed 
conflict.375 The UN Security Council also demands strict compliance with 
IHL obligations during armed conflicts.376 It is important to emphasize that 
it is only in the context of an armed conflict (an international armed con-
flict (IAC)377 or a non-international armed conflict (NIAC)378) that IHL 
rules apply.379  
While a discussion of the criteria for and rules specific to IACs and 
NIACs is beyond the scope this article,380 classifying a conflict is necessary 
to determine the specific legal regime applicable to that conflict381 and the 
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rules governing targeting decisions.382 Thus, if satellite signal interference is 
conducted in the context of an IAC, its use and application is subject to 
specific rules for IAC as set forth within the IHL normative framework. 
Likewise, if interference is utilized in a NIAC, the rules applicable to NIAC 
would apply. 
However, if satellite signal interference were employed in operations 
outside armed conflict, IHL considerations need not be made, even if such 
operations were directed at civilians or civilian objects.383 Additionally, IHL 
does not prohibit disseminating propaganda or economic sanctions delib-
erately targeting the military and civilian populations.384 Thus, if satellite 
signal interference were employed against commercial communication sat-
ellites and their signals for such purposes, the targeting of civilians and 
these civilian objects would be permissible under IHL, regardless of the 
unlawfulness of the jamming and spoofing activities under the ITU or ISL 
frameworks.  
Aside from the legality of a State’s decision to use force (jus ad bellum), 
discussed in Section V, the law governing the means and methods of force 
application (jus in bello), or IHL, always applies. In other words, IHL must 
always be respected and followed during an armed conflict regardless of 
whether the decision to use force was legitimate and within legal norms. 
The overarching IHL considerations include: military necessity, discrimina-
tion and proportionality. 
 
1. The Principle of Military Necessity 
 
Military necessity is part of customary international law for armed con-
flict.385 The principle of military necessity permits States to use only the de-
gree and kind of force required to achieve the legitimate purpose of the 
conflict.386 For a target to constitute a legitimate military objective, the re-
sponsible decision maker must determine, based on information reasonably 
available, that an object by its “nature, location and purpose or use make[s] 
                                                                                                                      
382. BOOTHBY, supra note 368, at 43. 
383. Droege, supra note 112, at 27. 
384. BOOTHBY, supra note 368, at 43. 
385. Yoram Dinstein, Legitimate Military Objectives under the Current Jus in Bello, in LE-
GAL AND ETHICAL LESSONS OF NATO’S KOSOVO CAMPAIGN 139, 140 (Andru E. Wall 
ed., 2002) (Vol. 78, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies). 
386. INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVO-
CATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER AND SCHOOL, LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK 139–40 (2001) 
[hereinafter LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK]; see also BOOTHBY, supra note 368, at 59. 
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an effective contribution to military action” and that its “total or partial 
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the 
time, offers a definite military advantage.”387 Attacks against civilian objects 
are prohibited.388 Objects contributing to military action by their “nature” 
include all objects used by the military, including weapons, equipment, 
transport, buildings occupied by the military and communication centers.389 
Such objects must have an inherent attribute or character that contributes 
to military action.390 Military objectives are not limited to military bases, 
units, equipment or forces, and may include other objects making an effec-
tive contribution to the opposing force’s ability to conduct hostilities. Ap-
plied to commercial satellite communications, interference may occur, as-
suming both a reasonable possibility exists that the communications make 
an effective contribution to military activities and interfering with the 
communications would offer a military advantage. 
A military’s use of any satellite to provide instantaneous global service 
during peace and in war satisfies the nature criteria and makes them lawful 
military objectives. This would also include military satellites, commercial 
communication satellites and GPS satellites, as well as remote sensing satel-
lites.391 “Location” refers to “objects which by their very nature have no 
military function but which, by virtue of their location, make an effective 
contribution to military action.”392 For commercial communication satel-
lites, this could be any satellite that is or can relay military communications 
or support military operations. In armed conflict, it would be important for 
one party to employ measures, such as jamming attacks against commercial 
communication satellites, to prevent the opposing force from using them. 
The “purpose” of a military objective relates to intended future uses of 
an object, whereas “use” reflects the object’s current function.393 With 
commercial communication satellites, because such objects make an effec-
tive contribution to the military at all times, and especially in armed conflict 
                                                                                                                      
387. API, supra note 374, art. 52(2). 
388. Id., arts. 52(1), 52(3). 
389. HEATHER HARRISON DINNISS, CYBER WARFARE AND THE LAWS OF WAR 185 
(2012); LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK, supra note 386, at 141–42. 
390. Id.  
391. Jarman, supra note 60, at 50. 
392. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GE-
NEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 2021 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & 
Bruno Zimmerman eds., 1987). 
393. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF IN-
TERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 89 (2d ed. 2010). 
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as demonstrated during the Iraq War, this means they are considered mili-
tary objectives, valid military targets and susceptible to attack. Along those 
same lines, any object launching jamming and spoofing attacks during 
armed conflict would also become a valid military objective and thus liable 
to attack.  
Given the military’s reliance and dependence on commercial communi-
cation satellites, it is obvious these satellites and systems can and will be 
targeted during armed conflict. Not only would disrupting such satellites 
provide an opposing force a clear and direct military advantage over their 
enemy, their disruption or destruction would likely (and quickly) lead to 
that enemy’s partial or complete submission. The use of satellite signal in-
terference in warfare would also allow States to avoid the physical destruc-
tion of satellite system components and contamination of the outer space 
environment.  
As the above discussion reveals, commercial communication satellites 
will often qualify as valid and lawful military targets under the principle of 
military necessity, and intentional interference as a means and method of 
warfare satisfies the degree of force requirement. The unavoidable fact is 
not only can civilian systems be lawfully targeted, but, when they are, mili-
tary and civilians using these systems have little legal protection under the 
principle of military necessity. 
 
2. The Principle of Discrimination  
 
Another fundamental principle of customary international law and IHL is 
the principle of discrimination.394 This principle, appearing first in 1868 in 
the preamble of the St. Petersburg Declaration,395 is now codified in Article 
48 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which dictates that 
civilians and civilian property must be protected from attacks. It provides: 
“In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population 
and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish 
between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian ob-
                                                                                                                      
394. BOOTHBY, supra note 368, at 60. 
395. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Un-
der 400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29/Dec. 11, 1868, 18 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 1) 
474, available at http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocume 
nt&documentId=568842C2B90F4A29C12563CD0051547C. 
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jects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations 
only against military objectives.”396 
According to Article 52 of Protocol I, civilian objects are defined as “all 
objects which are not military objectives.”397 Combatants must always dis-
tinguish themselves from civilians, and civilian objects must not be mistak-
en for military targets.398 In other words, if an object is claimed to be civil-
ian, it should be separated from military objects.   
In practicing discrimination, “constant care” must be taken “to spare 
the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.”399 Moreover, attacks 
against non-specific military targets or using methods that cannot be exclu-
sively targeted or contained against solely military targets are prohibited; 
they violate the distinction principle.400 However, as previously discussed 
above, these requirements would be virtually impossible to achieve with 
respect to dual-use commercial communication satellites. Because much of 
space is dual-use, complying with the distinction constraint requires a bal-
ancing of military necessity and civilian collateral effects.401 Thus, when 
commercial satellite signals qualify as valid military targets, but collateral 
effects expected are excessive in relation to military necessity, a violation of 
IHL occurs. 
Under Article 51(4) of Protocol I indiscriminate attacks are prohibit-
ed.402 According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, this 
provision is an “application of the prohibition on directing attacks against 
civilians or against civilian objects.”403 With respect to satellite signal inter-
ference and discrimination, many technologies used and employed to jam 
satellite signals may not be very precise. Indeed, jamming is a sloppy appli-
cation often resulting in the mass disruption of a wide range of adjacent 
signals. Thus, even if only one signal is targeted, other signals may also be 
disrupted. Despite this unintended impact on other signals, it does not nec-
essarily change the military validity of the targeted signal.  
                                                                                                                      
396. API, supra note 374, art. 48. 
397. Id., art. 52(1). 
398. Id., art. 57. Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, IT-95-16-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 521 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000). 
399. API, supra note 374, art. 57(1). 
400. Bourbonniére, Law of Armed Conflict, supra note 187, at 48. 
401. API, supra note 374, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)–57(2)(b). 
402. Id., art. 51(4). 
403. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 43 (Jean-Marie Hencka-
erts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2009). 
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Developed nations and sophisticated non-State actors may have meth-
ods and means to locate and target specific satellite signals, but groups of 
terrorists, individuals or unorganized groups may not. Thus, and as inter-
ference and jamming are increasingly employed during armed conflict by 
actors without the ability to precisely target specific signals, a wide range of 
State and non-State users may suffer disruptions. What is more, while in 
the midst of an intense armed conflict, it may be difficult for even the most 
technologically advanced State to pierce through the “fog of war”404 and 
foresee all of the resulting harms before using interference as a means and 
method of warfare. To do so would require technical precision, verification 
and thorough consideration of second and third order effects; not to do so 
could taint the use interference with illegality thereby violating IHL. If in-
tentional interference cannot distinguish legitimate from illegitimate targets, 
there may be an obligation to either forego the attack or use some other 
weapon with an ability to satisfy the discrimination requirement. Thus, 
while satellite signal interference may sometimes be an illegal means and 
method of warfare because it may not be able to adhere to the principle of 
discrimination, it may at other times be the only legal option.  
 
3. The Principle of Proportionality 
 
The principle of proportionality limits attack effects by requiring belliger-
ents to establish a balance between military and humanitarian interests.405 
Proportionality prohibits States from carrying out attacks when loss of life, 
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or a combination thereof 
would be excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated.406 Pro-
portionality requires a balancing of anticipated military advantage against 
anticipated damage caused.407 Proportionality also requires military com-
manders to “do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be at-
tacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects,” “take all feasible precau-
tions” necessary to avoid or minimize incidental loss or damage and, when 
                                                                                                                      
404. The “fog of war” refers to the uncertainty in situational awareness that arises 
during war. CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 20 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds. & 
trans., Princeton University Press 1976) (1832).  
405. Bourbonniére, Law of Armed Conflict, supra note 187, at 47. 
406. API, supra note 374, art. 51(5)(b). 
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possible, choose objectives that will “cause the least danger to civilians.”408 
This means if intentional interference with commercial communication sat-
ellites were reasonably expected to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering, it would be prohibited under the principle of proportionality.409 
Even the ICJ noted uncertainty with respect to the type of weapons that 
could be used lawfully. Specifically, in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion 
the ICJ stated even though the threat or use of nuclear weapons should 
comply with IHL, to do so does not in all circumstances constitute a viola-
tion of international law.410 
As can be seen, the nature of dual-use commercial communication sat-
ellites and the use of satellite signal interference in warfare significantly 
complicates the application and consideration of IHL principles. One of 
the most discussed examples of targeting dual-use objects in warfare is the 
bombing of the Iraqi power grid during the 1990–91 Gulf War. As noted 
by Professor Yoram Dinstein, 
 
Since the electrical grid in Iraq was totally integrated, attacks against it—
and its installations—resulted not only in a tremendous military ad-
vantage (shutting down radar stations, military computers, etc.), but also 
extensive damage to civilians: hospitals stopped operating, water pumping 
and filtering facilities came to a standstill, etc. From a legal point of view, 
a “dual use” of Iraq’s electrical grid did not alter its singular and unequiv-
ocal status as a military objective. There was, as usual with military objec-
tives, the question of proportionality where collateral damage is con-
cerned. But the extensive damage to civilians was not excessive in relation 
to the military advantage anticipated.411  
 
The bombing of the Iraqi electrical grid clearly suggests commercial 
communication satellites will be targeted in future conflicts in lieu of kinet-
ic attacks and that civilians will face consequences in the future as military 
and civilian systems become increasingly interconnected and as civilian ob-
jects become progressively dual-use. However, whereas the military objec-
tive in Iraq was accomplished through the kinetic bombing and physical 
destruction of the power grid, the future of warfare involving satellite sig-
                                                                                                                      
408. API, supra note 374, art. 57(2). 
409. Id., arts. 35(1)–35(2), 85. 
410. See Nuclear Weapons, supra note 375, ¶ 42; see also Freeland, supra note 371, at 281. 
411. Yoram Dinstein, Discussion, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL LESSONS OF NATO’S KO-
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nal interference could cause less permanent damage and destruction. Thus, 
even though IHL clearly permits targeting commercial communication sat-
ellite and their supporting systems in armed conflict, when they are target-
ed, IHL may be able to ensure civilians are protected because IHL requires 
belligerents to consider the use of less destructive means to accomplish 
military objectives.  
Assessing the potential direct and indirect damage to civilians and civil-
ian objects will likely prove difficult as States consider targeting commercial 
communication satellites by engaging in satellite signal interference. States 
may also have difficulty balancing civilian damage, loss of life and injuries 
against anticipated “concrete and direct military advantage.” The key to 
limiting unintended collateral effects will be the sophistication of the entity 
employing satellite signal interference, the technical ability to effectively 
limit intended effects to carefully vetted targets and due diligence in appro-
priately considering and applying the principles of IHL. How this will play 
out in future armed conflicts remains to be seen.  
 
IV.  SATELLITE SIGNAL INTERFERENCE UNDER THE UN CHARTER 
 
As dependency on satellite technologies and communications increases 
globally, State and non-State actors are becoming increasingly vulnerable to 
the consequences of disrupted transmissions. This emerging phenomenon 
reveals existing norms are unable to address the growing problem of inter-
ference. Thus, as satellite signal interference becomes more prevalent and 
collateral consequences become more severe, States will need to know how 
to characterize such acts and under what circumstances self-defense is justi-
fied. With this understanding, this Section addresses the implications of 
satellite signal interference under the normative framework of the UN 
Charter and focuses on circumstances under which satellite signal interfer-
ence can be characterized as an “armed attack” under Article 51 triggering 
the right of self-defense.  
 
A. The Prohibition of the Threat or Use of Force  
 
The UN Charter and its focus on peace is the result of the international 
community’s desire “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of 
war, which twice in [their] lifetime [had] brought untold sorrow to man-
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kind.”412 Despite its imperative for preserving international peace and secu-
rity, the UN Charter does not ban all use of force. Rather, it outlaws ag-
gressive use of force, and establishes the general principle that armed con-
flict is neither proper nor inevitable, irrespective of the political purposes 
or merits. To that end, the UN Charter restates customary norms related to 
the behavior of States with respect to the threat or use of force413 and reaf-
firms the duty of States to resolve all international disputes through “peace-
ful means in such a manner that international peace and security . . . are not 
endangered.”414  
The principle prohibiting the “threat or use of force” by States is con-
sidered jus cogens415 and is an obligation erga omnes.416 The ICJ has opined that 
the principle is also binding on all States as a customary norm.417 The pro-
hibition against the “use of force,” the scope of which remains hotly con-
tested,418 is also codified in Article 2(4) of the Charter. Article 2(4) is the 
key prescription in international law regarding the use of force.419  
Article 2(4), described as “the cornerstone of peace”420 and as “the 
heart of the United Nations Charter”421 states: “All members shall refrain in 
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the terri-
torial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other man-
ner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”422 
This prohibition is complemented by the customary norm of non-
intervention, which, as addressed above, dictates States must not directly or 
                                                                                                                      
412. U.N. Charter pmbl. 
413. IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 112–13 (1963). 
[hereinafter BROWNLIE, USE OF FORCE]. 
414. U.N. Charter art. 2(3).  
415. Jus cogens is the legal term given to norms of general international law from which 
no derogation is allowed under any circumstances. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 489 (6th ed. 2003). 
416. Erga omnes obligations are owed to the international community as a whole. Bar-
celona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5). 
417. Nicaragua, supra note 361, ¶ 190. 
418. Maogoto & Freeland, supra note 54, at 1105. 
419. Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International 
Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 
885, 900 (1999) [hereinafter Schmitt, Computer Network Attack]. 
420. CLAUD H.M. WALDOCK, THE REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE BY INDI-
VIDUAL STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 492 (1952). 
421. Louis Henkin, The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) are Greatly Exaggerated, 65 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 544 (1971). 
422. U.N. Charter art. 2(4). 
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indirectly interfere with the internal affairs of other States.423 When inter-
vention takes the form of a use or threat of force, it breaches not only the 
norm of non-intervention, but also Article 2(4).424 
Despite intense debate over the scope of Article 2(4), the prevailing 
view is that Article 2(4) is limited to the use of armed force and does not 
include economic or political coercion.425 Some States, however, may be 
starting to favor a more expansive interpretation of Article 2(4) to include 
coercive activities, such as computer network attacks.426 While such an ex-
pansion may emerge through State practice, the prevailing view is that Arti-
cle 2(4) applies to any use of force not otherwise permitted by the terms of 
the Charter.427  
Article 2(4) sets the threshold for when a “threat or use of force” 
breaches international law. That threshold, however, is subject to two ex-
ceptions: (1) actions and measures specifically authorized by the UN Secu-
rity Council428 and (2) actions taken in self-defense in response to an 
“armed attack.”429 Therefore, any use of force falling outside of these two 
exceptions would violate Article 2(4), whereas measures falling short of a 
use of force would not. Before addressing the two exceptions to Article 
2(4), which will take place in Section V, the prohibition on the use of force 
must be clarified. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
423. Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, G.A. 
Res. 37/10, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/10 (1982); Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra 
note 360. 
424. Nicaragua, supra note 361, ¶ 209. 
425. THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 117–18 (Bruno 
Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS]. 
426. WALTER G. SHARP, CYBER SPACE AND THE USE OF FORCE 130–33 (1999) (argu-
ing that United States national policies indicate a wide range of cyber activities should fall 
within the prohibition of Article 2(4)). 
427. Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Operations in International Law: The Use of Force, Collective 
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1. Defining the Use of Force 
 
Article 2(4) renders only specific uses of force wrongful.430 While the no-
tion of force is disputed,431 some suggest the proper view is that “force” 
denotes “armed force,”432 meaning a “resort to a violent weapon that inflicts 
human injury.”433 Consistent with this view, armed force also includes all 
activities related to military action, ranging from the transfer of soldiers and 
tanks to country borders to acts of war, including dropping bombs and fir-
ing artillery.434 Even the Charter travaux preparatoires and the Declaration on 
Principles of International Law, Friendly Relations and Co-Operation 
among States support the view that only military force is the focus of the 
Article 2(4) prohibition on the use of force.435  
Ultimately, international law perceives the unlawful recourse to the un-
lawful use of force as an act of “aggression.”436 While there is no legally 
binding definition of “aggression,” UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 
articulates specific acts which the international community believes to be 
“aggression” and thus illegitimate uses of force. Entitled, UN Resolution 
on the Definition of Aggression, Resolution 3314, which as a General As-
sembly resolution is non-binding, defines aggression as “the use of armed 
force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of another state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Charter of the UN, as set out in this definition.”437 Article 3 of the Resolu-
tion presents a non-exhaustive list of conduct amounting to acts constitut-
ing aggression, all of which require the use of “armed force,” such as inva-
                                                                                                                      
430. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack, supra note 419, at 900. 
431. Id. at 904; CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 425, at 117. 
432. BROWNLIE, USE OF FORCE, supra note 413, at 362; YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, 
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(emphasis added). 
433. Christopher C. Joyner & Catherine Lotrionte, Information Warfare as International 
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sions, bombardments and naval blockades.438 Under Article 4, however, 
Resolution 3314 does not limit acts of aggression to those only coming 
from uses of armed force.439 
The use of indirect armed force, referring to the participation of one 
State in the use of force by another State, also falls within the ambit of Ar-
ticle 2(4) of the UN Charter.440 This includes one State allowing its territory 
to be used for violent acts against a third State, as well as providing assis-
tance to anti-government forces such as was found in the Nicaragua case.441 
In that case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) drew somewhat of a 
line as to what constituted a wrongful use of force. It stated: 
 
[W]hile arming and training of the contras can certainly be said to involve 
the threat or use of force against Nicaragua, this is not necessarily so in 
respect of all assistance given by the United States Government. In par-
ticular . . . the mere supply of funds to the contras, while undoubtedly an 
act of intervention in the internal affairs of Nicaragua . . . does not itself 
amount to a use of force.442 
 
Even though the ICJ did little to clarify the scope of the prohibition on the 
use of force regarding assisting subversive activities,443 the Court estab-
lished the use of force includes actively and directly preparing and assisting 
others to apply armed force.444 
 
2. Defining Armed Attacks 
 
The term “armed attack” is not only linguistically different than other simi-
lar terms within the UN Charter, it has also been interpreted more narrow-
ly.445 In Nicaragua, the ICJ held to qualify as an armed attack sufficient to 
trigger a response under Article 51, attacks must constitute the “most grave 
                                                                                                                      
438. Id., art. 3. 
439. Noah Weisbord, Conceptualizing Aggression, 20 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE 
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forms of the use of force.”446 Thus, there may be acts that violate the pro-
hibition on the use or threat of force, but they may not rise to the level of 
an armed attack as they are not “most grave.” For example, the ICJ held 
where a cross-border incursion is minor in “scale and effects,” it is merely a 
“frontier incident” and not an “armed attack.”447 According to Professor 
Michael Schmitt, the phrase “scale and effects” is simple shorthand for the 
quantitative and qualitative factors considered when determining whether a 
certain action qualifies as a use of force.448  
The ICJ noted the need to distinguish the most grave forms of the use 
of force (those which constitute an armed attack for purposes of Article 
51) from those that are less grave.449 It offered modest guidance in doing 
so, suggesting that it is the “scale and effects” of the consequences that 
differentiate acts qualifying as an “armed attack” from those that do not.450 
In 2003, the ICJ revisited Nicaragua in the Oil Platforms case and invoked 
Nicaragua’s threshold test in order to characterize “the most grave forms of 
the use of force.”451 Beyond confirming the threshold test in Nicaragua, 
however, the Court did nothing to clarify the most grave forms of force 
from those less grave.452 Accordingly, beyond the requirement that a use of 
force must be “grave,” the parameters of the scale and effects criteria re-
main unsettled.453  
Against this backdrop, the question at hand is thus: could a non-kinetic 
weapon such as satellite signal interference ever constitute a use of force or 
an armed attack? Fortunately, this point was previously addressed by the 
ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, which held, “any use of force, 
regardless of weapons employed” is governed by the UN Charter.454 In 
other words, the issue is not the type of weapon employed, but rather 
whether such use could constitute a use of force or an armed attack. Thus, 
just as non-kinetic chemical, biological, and radiological attacks are assessed 
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BOURNE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 241, 249–51 (2004). 
453. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 364, at 55. 
454. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 375, ¶ 39. 
 
 
 
 International Law Studies 2014 
172 
 
 
 
 
 
 
under the use of force or armed attack threshold, so too should satellite 
signal interference.  
Despite some ambiguity surrounding the scope of use of force or 
where the threshold lies for an act to rise to the level of an armed attack, 
several conclusions can easily be made. First, not all uses of force rise to 
the level of an armed attack. Second, any act rising to the level of an armed 
attack is also a use of force. Third, uses of force need not involve a State’s 
direct use of armed forces. Fourth, it is the scale and effects and conse-
quences of the act that matter,455 more than whether the act is, in fact, 
armed, direct, indirect, kinetic or even non-kinetic.  
Applying the parameters outlined above to satellite signal interference, 
one can make several observations. First, non-destructive activities such as 
spoofing a signal and broadcasting signals or messages intended to merely 
undermine confidence in a State’s government or its economy would likely 
never qualify as a prohibited use of force. Second, neither funding a group 
conducting interference as part of an uprising nor providing an organized 
group with the training and equipment necessary to carry out satellite signal 
interference qualifies as an unlawful use of force, even though it may vio-
late the customary norm of non-interference or the ITU regime. Third, sat-
ellite signal interference resulting in physical harm to people or damage to 
tangible property may equate to an unlawful use of force.456   
Even though satellite signal interference may be unlawful under the 
ITU and ISL frameworks, that alone does not indicate the interference will 
constitute a use of force. Satellite signal interference may only violate the 
ITU and/or ISL, or it may constitute a violation on the prohibition against 
unlawful intervention. In such cases, a States’ response is limited to only 
those permissible under the relevant ITU, ISL or non-intervention frame-
works. Responses to such acts will be addressed in Section V. 
 
B. Satellite Signal Interference as an Armed Attack 
 
Because satellite signal interference does not resemble armed attacks tradi-
tionally regulated under the law of war framework, can existing norms be 
applied and adapted to cope with this emerging phenomenon? The answer 
rests within the scholarly debates and the body of law currently developing 
with regard to information operations, namely CNAs.  
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1. Current Debates over the Application of the Jus ad Bellum 
 
In academic debates over the characterization of CNAs as a use of force, 
three different views have emerged: an instrument-based approach, a tar-
get-based approach and an effects-based approach.457 This author asserts 
the effects-based approach, which scrutinizes the consequences caused by 
an act, is the most practical and appropriate framework to apply to CNAs 
and to satellite signal interference.  
Professor Duncan Hollis argues that, under an instrument-based ap-
proach, an operation such as CNA does not “qualify as armed force be-
cause it lacks the physical characteristics traditionally associated with mili-
tary coercion.”458 Under his analysis, satellite signal interference would al-
most never qualify as a use of force despite its potential to cause crippling 
effects because the interference does not involve the use of traditional mili-
tary weapons.459 The instrument-based approach “seeks to regulate the 
conflicts of yesterday”460 that were conducted in environments devoid of 
modern infrastructure, targets, weapons and capabilities, and is thus wholly 
inadequate in the modern world.461  
With a target-based approach, acts are characterized as a use of force or 
an armed attack whenever they “penetrate ‘critical national infrastructure’ 
systems,” even without “significant destruction or casualties.”462 According 
to Hollis, the target-based approach focuses on determining when a State 
may respond in self-defense.463 Under this approach, the mere identity of a 
target can authorize forceful self-defense.464 In the context of satellite signal 
interference, even a slight intrusion into, or disruption of, a critical system 
could then be argued to justify an armed military response. The target-
based approach expands the right of self-defense significantly, and, in do-
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ing so, could threaten international peace and security by making armed 
conflict more likely.465 
The effects-based approach, the most compelling and widely accepted 
of the three, focuses on the consequences or effects of the act.466 This ap-
proach assesses whether the act in question causes effects equivalent to 
those produced by military force (damage to property or death).467 The ef-
fects-based approach also assumes States want to preserve their ability to 
take a wide range of action, as well as avoid the harmful consequences 
caused by others.468 
The most well-known proponent of the effects-based approach is Pro-
fessor Schmitt who states the effects and consequences of a CNA should 
be assessed according to seven factors to determine whether the CNA con-
stitutes a use of force.469 These factors, deriving from that which historical-
ly made military force special in international law,470 include: (1) severity: 
scale, scope and duration of the harm or damage; (2) immediacy: how 
quickly the consequences manifest after the act; (3) directness: how directly 
tied the consequences are to the act; (4) measurability: the extent to which 
damage can be identified and quantified; (5) invasiveness: the extent to 
which the act penetrated or intruded into a targeted system; (6) presump-
tive legitimacy: determining whether the act is unlawful; and (7) responsi-
bility: the extent to which a State is involved in an act.471  
These factors have also been formally recognized by an International 
Group of Experts472 in the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable 
to Cyber Warfare as that which States will likely consider when characterizing 
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whether a non-kinetic act (CNA) is a use of force.473 The Tallinn Manual, 
released in October 2012, adopted the seven factors described above and 
added a final factor, military character. The specifics of the eight factors are 
more fully described below: 
 
Severity of the Damage: If physical harm is caused to people or 
property, the act will likely qualify as a use of force. If death does 
not result or if the damage is de minimis, it is less likely that the act 
will be viewed as a use of force. Acts resulting in nothing more 
than mere inconvenience, irritation or annoyance will never amount 
to a use of force. 
  
Immediacy of the Consequences: The sooner the effects of an act 
are seen (such as when a bomb explodes), the greater likelihood 
there is that a State will view such act as a use of force. If conse-
quences are delayed or occur slowly over a long period of time, it is 
more likely that a State would view the act not as a use of force but 
as one to be dealt with via diplomacy. 
 
Directness: The more closely tied the consequences are to the act 
itself, the more likely it is that States will consider that act to be in 
violation of the prohibition on the use of force. 
 
Invasiveness: The more invasive an act is into the targeted State, 
the more likely it is that a State will consider it to be a use of force. 
In other words, the more protected a system is from an intrusion, 
the greater the concern is as to its penetration. 
 
Measurability of the Damage: If the consequences and effects of 
the act are identifiable and quantifiable, the easier it is for a State to 
assess whether the act rises to the level of a use of force. 
 
Presumptive Legitimacy: If an act is presumptively legal, that is, it is 
not specifically prohibited, the less likely it is that a State will con-
sider that act to be a use of force.  
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Military Character: If the act is employed by a State’s military, the 
greater likelihood there is that the act will be characterized as a use 
of force. 
 
State Involvement: The clearer it is that a State is responsible for or 
involved with an act, the greater the likelihood is that such act will 
be characterized as a use of force.474  
 
These eight factors provide States significant latitude in characterizing 
acts as a use of force, which could favor a finding of a use of force.475 
These factors also allow States to balance conflicting objectives of avoiding 
the harmful consequences caused by the actions of other States, while 
maintaining the ability to take a wide variety of actions in peacetime and 
war. 
In applying these factors, States measure the consequences of the act in 
question, as well as the perpetrator’s identity, to determine whether the act 
is outside the use of force boundary or is similar to the consequences most 
often resulting from armed force.476 If the assessment reveals the conse-
quences at issue fall outside the use of force boundary, then the act can 
never rise to the level of a use of force or an armed attack. On the other 
hand, if the assessment reveals the consequences resemble those resulting 
from armed force, then the use of force prohibition would apply.477 
Admittedly, these factors were never set forth as a tool for assessing 
satellite signal interference, nor are they legally prescriptive. In fact, these 
factors are considerations in a political determination or decision rather 
than a legal one. Nonetheless, because there is no specific or conclusive 
definitional threshold for determining uses of force, nor is there any nor-
mative framework available for assessing satellite signal interference, this 
approach and these eight factors provide a persuasive means to assess in-
terference in the context of international law. What is more, considering 
States are usually most concerned with the effects and consequences of 
actions, rather than weapons employed, the effects-based approach more 
appropriately assesses and addresses emerging intangible modern technolo-
gies and warfare. Finally, while satellite signal interference has never been 
publically declared to be an unlawful use of force or an armed attack by any 
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State, it is likely when or if it is, it will be assessed by the resulting conse-
quences and effects. 
 
2. Assessing Satellite Signal Interference under the Effects-Based  
Approach 
 
With the effects-based approach in mind, we can assess several examples 
of satellite signal interference and determine where, if at all, they should lie 
in the use of force spectrum. At one end of the spectrum, satellite signal 
interference is mere annoyance or inconvenience, and temporarily denies 
or disrupts satellite communications. The severity is minimal, the duration 
is short, there is no physical damage and the ability to measure the scope 
and degree of consequences is neither definitive nor quantifiable. Such a 
scenario clearly falls outside the scale and effects of those typical of an 
armed force and thus falls outside the ambit of Article 2(4).  
Now consider a situation where satellite signals directing commercial 
airliners are disrupted and two planes collide and crash within a heavily 
populated city. The death toll and property losses would be severe, just as 
if the planes had been hit by a missile. Assuming signals were protected by 
way of uplink and downlink encryptions, the act is arguably quite invasive. 
The damage and harm are clearly measurable in lives and property loss. 
Without question, this act constitutes a use of force and undoubtedly satis-
fies the requisite threshold of severity and gravity to qualify as an armed 
attack. 
Similarly, if TT&C signals of a satellite are intentionally jammed and 
the satellite collides with other satellites in orbit, the act would likely be 
characterized as severe and also directly tied to jamming. The jamming re-
sulted in substantial economic loss of the satellites, created a cloud of de-
bris endangering other objects in space and violated the ITU and ISL 
frameworks. In this case, the act would likely qualify as a use of force and 
be of sufficient gravity to be considered an armed attack.  
A more difficult case, however, is satellite signal interference causing 
massive disruptions within a State’s critical infrastructure, but which results 
in no physical damage or human harm. This author asserts because most 
definitions of critical infrastructure include services such as security, water 
and food, transportation, finance, health, energy, and governmental and 
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public services,478 such an act could constitute a use of force if it led to sig-
nificant or long-term disruptions of a State’s critical infrastructure and im-
pacted a State’s ability to provide essential services to its citizens. In fact, as 
a Russian official once stated, “[a]n attack against the telecommunications 
and electronic power industries of the United States would, by virtue of its 
catastrophic consequences, completely overlap with the use of weapons of 
mass destruction.”479 If true, such an attack might surpass the quantitative 
criterion of an armed attack. Thus, while loss of satellite television coverage 
of the National Football League’s Super Bowl might seem catastrophic to 
football fans and result in financial losses for satellite providers and adver-
tisers, it would likely never rise to the level of an armed attack. However, if 
the disruption led to food contamination, fatal transportation sector acci-
dents, financial market collapse and nuclear reactor meltdowns, or prevent-
ed essential governmental functioning or access to public utilities such as 
water or emergency services, the act might very well be characterized as an 
armed attack. As can be seen, there is no clear bright line. The determining 
factor remains the severity of consequences.  
No doubt, some acts of interference may more easily be considered a 
use of force, whereas others clearly would not. Additionally, given the req-
uisite threshold required for armed attacks, intentional interference will on-
ly in exceptional cases trigger the right of self-defense. Considering current 
State practice, States seem unwilling to draw too much attention to inter-
ference incidents for what could be a number of reasons. Perhaps this is 
because States want to retain the ability to engage in such acts or because 
they wish to avoid an unnecessary escalation of tensions with States from 
which interference is sourced. Regardless, if one State characterizes an act 
of intentional interference as a use of force or as an armed attack, it will 
have to be prepared to accept a consistent characterization in comparable 
cases where a similar action is taken by that State against another State.  
In the event of doubt as to whether interference rises to the level of a 
use of force, States would be cautious before characterizing such incidents 
as an armed attack. If not so characterized, a State might not be entitled to 
assert a right of armed self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter. In such 
circumstances, the State, to comply with the letter and intent of interna-
tional law, would have to pursue resolution of the matter diplomatically 
through the ITU framework, engage in non-use of force countermeasures 
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or take the matter before the Security Council to determine if a “threat to 
the peace” occurred under Article 39 of the UN Charter. The State would 
also be able to make a diplomatic claim with the other State on the basis of 
a breach of international obligation.  
 
C. Interference Conducted by Non-State Actors 
 
Neither UN Charter Article 2(4) nor its customary norm equivalent apply 
to the acts of non-State actors, including individuals, organized groups, ter-
rorist organizations and the like, unless attributable to a State pursuant to 
the rules set out within the Articles on Responsibility of States for Interna-
tionally Wrongful Acts.480 This means, while intentional interference con-
ducted by non-State actors may be unlawful under domestic law or interna-
tional legal frameworks, by itself it is not a violation of the prohibition on 
the use of force. As noted in Section III, member States are obligated to 
comply with ITU provisions and cooperate with others in eliminating 
harmful interference.481 Additionally, under ISL, States bear international 
responsibility for national activities in outer space.482  
Since the ITU and ISL frameworks do little to enforce protections 
against acts of intentional interference, a question emerges: what can States 
do when acts amount to an armed attack and trigger the State’s right of 
self-defense? In answering this question, it is important to locate the source 
of the attack and determine whether the act is attributable to a State. De-
spite the provisions of Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty under which 
all acts can always be attributed to States, the difficulty is establishing a suf-
ficient link between the State and the non-State entity or actor committing 
the unlawful act.483  
With regard to attributing an act to a State, “the problem is not . . . the 
legal process of imputing the act to a particular State . . . but the prior pro-
cess of tracing material proof of the identity of the perpetrator.”484 Thus, 
even though satellite signal interference can be detected by using antennas 
to co-locate the source of the jamming signal, it may be challenging to pin-
point the precise source of the interference in a timely manner. What is 
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more, even if the location of the interference is discovered, it may still be 
difficult and time-consuming to identify the person who operated the 
jamming equipment or to “identify the real ‘mastermind’ behind the at-
tack.”485  
The problem of attribution is not limited to acts of intentional interfer-
ence; it is one of the biggest difficulties associated with CNAs.486 Such a 
challenge also extends to conventional attacks carried out anonymously or 
by groups such as terrorist organizations claiming responsibility when it 
appears that such a group was incapable or did not have the resources to 
carry out such an attack.487 There are also issues of attribution with State-
sponsored terrorism activities when the State fails to take responsibility for 
its role.488 Nevertheless, in every case, a victim State must establish attribu-
tion to a State.  
While this article will not address this issue at greater length, there is a 
fair amount of disagreement on the issue of attribution regarding conven-
tional attacks, as well as with CNAs.489 Despite this disagreement, a State 
may not knowingly allow “its territory to be used for acts contrary to the 
rights of other states,”490 nor can its territory be used for military acts 
against another State.491 Additionally, a State must not knowingly allow 
armed bands or terrorists to use its territory as a sanctuary from which it 
levies attacks against military targets or civilian objects within another 
country.492  
In the Armed Activities case, however, even though the ICJ recognized 
toleration by a State of non-State actors who subsequently carried out an 
attack on another State could trigger a right of self-defense, it nonetheless 
failed to find such a right in that case.493 In the Oil Platforms case, however, 
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the ICJ effectively held the burden of proof rests on the State invoking the 
right of self-defense.494 In the Corfu Channel case, the ICJ noted the difficul-
ty of obtaining evidence of a perpetrator when the territory at issue is un-
der the exclusive control of another State and allowed for “a more liberal 
recourse to inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence.”495 The Court 
endorsed circumstantial evidence as sufficient, as long as the proof derived 
from inferences of fact and those facts did not leave room for reasonable 
doubt.496 Thus, “a State should not resort to self-defense on the basis of 
casual evidence or wild political inferences.”497 
Assuming there is sufficient evidence to implicate a State in an unlawful 
act, a victim State may only take action against another State if the act is 
attributable under international law. The general rule is the only acts at-
tributable to a State are those conducted by persons acting under the direc-
tion of the State.498 This would include all individuals or collective entities, 
making up the organization of the State and acting on its behalf,499 such as 
the military or any other State entity.  
A State, however, may only take action against another State in self-
defense if attribution standards are also met500 or with the agreement of the 
UN Security Council. Attacks can also be attributed to a State if they are 
conducted by State organs,501 controlled by the State,502 or due to the State’s 
intentional failure to prevent the attack.503 If the attack cannot be attributed 
to the State, the non-State actor committing the attack can become the di-
rect target of the self-defense action.504 In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ at-
tributed acts committed by organs of the United States to the United 
States, but also noted there was insufficient evidence the United States had 
actual control “in all fields [activities] as to justify treating the contras as act-
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ing on its behalf.”505 The ICJ also noted, even though some activities con-
ducted by the contras forces were highly dependent on the United States, 
they nonetheless did not constitute de facto control by the United States. 
506 The ICJ reached a similar conclusion in the Bosnia Genocide case.507  
Additionally, in the Tehran hostage’s case, the ICJ held to attribute the 
occupation of the U.S. Embassy by militants to the State of Iran, the Unit-
ed States had to establish the militants acted on behalf of the State or were 
directed by an organ of the State to carry out a specific operation.508 With-
out launching into the intricacies of these decisions, for attacks to be at-
tributed to a State under international law, the State had to have issued spe-
cific instructions or directed or controlled the operation.509 Then, in the 
Tadić case, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
went further, noting it is enough the State authorities exercised “overall 
control” over an organized and hierarchical structured group without a 
need for specific control or direction over individual conduct.510 Addition-
ally, in the Tadić Appeals Chamber Judgment, it was noted that courts have 
not considered overall control or general control to be sufficient with re-
spect to individuals or groups not organized into military structures.511 In a 
subsequent decision, the ICJ distinguished the overall control test from 
that conducted for the purpose of establishing State responsibility.512  
Applying this understanding to satellite signal interference, an attack 
carried out by non-State actors may be attributed to a State only if the act 
was carried out by an organ of the State; by those acting under its direction, 
instructions, control or direct influence prior to the act; or by non-State 
actors tolerated by a State.513 If the interference attack cannot be attributed 
to a State, but is carried out by a non-State actor, the non-State actor can 
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become the target of the victim State’s self-defense action.514 Nevertheless, 
all responses to attacks, whether individual or collective, warrant only those 
measures both “proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond 
to it.”515 
 
V. LAWFUL RESPONSES TO SATELLITE SIGNAL INTERFERENCE 
 
Having discussed satellite signal interference as an unlawful act under the 
ITU and ISL frameworks, as an unlawful intervention, as a prohibited use 
of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and as an armed attack under 
Article 51 of the Charter, this Section looks to the spectrum of permissible 
parameters of lawful responses to such acts. It briefly discusses some of the 
remedies and responses available to States under international law when 
unlawful satellite signal interference falls outside the scope of the Charter. 
Finally, this Section addresses responses available to States under the Char-
ter framework, namely actions and measures authorized by the Security 
Council and forcible actions taken in self-defense in response to armed at-
tacks.  
 
A.   Remedies for Internationally Wrongful Acts under State Responsibility  
 
In any case of State responsibility for an internationally unlawful act, victim 
States are entitled to reparations as set forth in the Articles on Responsibil-
ity of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.516 Reparations can take the 
form of restitution, compensation or satisfaction, either singly or in combi-
nation.517 With respect to satellite signal interference, if no material harm is 
caused, reparations by the injuring State, such as cessation of the interfer-
ence, may be sufficient to remedy the situation. If a victim State suffers ma-
terial damage, however, such as physical damage or financial losses, com-
pensation could be claimed by the injured State to wipe out all the conse-
quences of the wrongful act.518 An injured State may also take responsive 
measures neither amounting to a use of force nor breaching any existing 
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treaty or customary law obligation,519 such as stopping or suspending inter-
national telecommunications pursuant to Articles 34 and 35 of the ITU 
Constitution. An injured State could also respond with retorsions,520 includ-
ing severing diplomatic relations, imposing trade embargos and closing 
their borders to the offending State, as well as engaging in countermeas-
ures. 
 
B. Countermeasures  
 
Countermeasures regulate how States may respond to violations of interna-
tional law, including, but not limited to, those acts not rising to the level of 
armed attack justifying self-defense. Considered a form of self-help, coun-
termeasures respond to the position of an injured State when due process 
of law is not yet guaranteed or when the responsible State is not cooperat-
ing in a legal process.521  
Formerly known as reprisals,522 countermeasures are otherwise wrong-
ful acts not involving the use of force used by States in response to an in-
ternationally unlawful act “to procure its cessation and to achieve repara-
tion for the injury.”523 In other words, countermeasures are peaceful 
measures falling outside the scope of accepted exceptions to Article 2(4) of 
the UN Charter used to enforce international law.524 The purpose of coun-
termeasures is to induce a wrongdoing State to comply with its internation-
al obligations,525 not to create new non-rectifiable situations.526 
According to the ICJ in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, specific prerequi-
sites and conditions apply for countermeasures to be justified and lawful.527 
Specifically, countermeasures must be in response to a prior wrongful act 
taken by another State and must be directed against the State committing 
the wrongful act.528 Additionally, the injured State must have called upon 
                                                                                                                      
519. Schmitt, Cyber Operations, supra note 427, at 159. 
520. Retorsions are lawful unfriendly acts made in response to violations of interna-
tional law. STATE RESPONSIBILITY COMMENTARIES, supra note 498, at 281–82. 
521. Id. 
522. SHAW, supra note 483, at 708. 
523. STATE RESPONSIBILITY COMMENTARIES, supra note 498, at 168–69. 
524. ELENA K. PROUKAKI, THE PROBLEM OF ENFORCEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 68 (2010). 
525. STATE RESPONSIBILITY COMMENTARIES, supra note 498, at 284–87. 
526. Id. 
527. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 55–57 (Sept. 25). 
528. Id. at 55. 
 
 
 
Legality of Interference with Commercial Satellite Signals Vol. 90 
 
185 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the offending State to make reparation for it.529 Countermeasures must also 
be proportionate to the act and reversible.530 Finally, countermeasures must 
be terminated as soon as the responsible State complies with its obliga-
tions.531  
Not all otherwise wrongful acts are considered to be valid counter-
measures. Acts violating the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of 
force as embodied in the UN Charter are unlawful, as are acts that violate 
fundamental human rights.532 Other unlawful acts include those violating 
other preemptory norms of international law and those violating humani-
tarian obligations of a State.533 Additionally, countermeasures are not to be 
used as a form of punishment.534 They are only to be used to vindicate in-
jured States’ rights and restore the legal relationship with the responsible 
State to normalcy.535  
The international law of countermeasures does not define satellite sig-
nal interference as unlawful. The law of countermeasures simply specifies 
that whenever any State commits an internationally wrongful act, an injured 
State may respond with a countermeasure.536 Thus, whenever satellite signal 
interference is unlawful, a victim State may respond by employing coun-
termeasures.  
As previously concluded, satellite signal interference can constitute a 
breach of international obligations under the ITU and ISL even when not 
rising to the level of a use of force or an armed attack. Satellite signal inter-
ference may also be considered in violation of the customary international 
law principle of non-intervention537 as a wrongful interference with State 
sovereignty. Finally, satellite signal interference may be a breach of a State’s 
obligation “not to knowingly allow its territory to be used for action con-
trary to the rights of other States.”538 In each of these instances, satellite 
signal interference qualifies as an internationally unlawful act justifying a 
                                                                                                                      
529. Id. at 55–57. 
530. Id. 
531. STATE RESPONSIBILITY COMMENTARIES, supra note 498, at 286. 
532. State Responsibility, supra note 263, art. 50(1)(a–b). 
533. Id., art. 50(1)(c–d). 
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536. State Responsibility, supra note 263, art. 49. 
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State’s use of countermeasures, regardless of whether the acts of interfer-
ence were carried out, facilitated by or not prevented by State officials. This 
makes countermeasures an especially valuable tool in situations where satel-
lite signal interference is being employed by non-State entities, because an 
injured State does not have to attribute the act of jamming itself to a State 
before it can respond with countermeasures. In other words, the initial 
threshold requirement of an internationally wrongful act by a State may be 
established if the State where the interference originated failed to prevent 
the unlawful act despite its duty to do so. Thus, when a State suspects an 
act can be attributed to another State, but cannot prove it, the injured State 
can still utilize countermeasures to vindicate its rights. 
Once the initial threshold is established, the primary constraints on 
how countermeasures may be exercised require they be both necessary and 
proportional.539 The principle of necessity reflects the corrective function 
to achieve compliance,540 as well as the purpose of preserving the rights of 
the injured State.541 Necessity also dictates that, before countermeasures are 
taken, the injured State must call upon the responsible State to cease its 
wrongful conduct and offer to negotiate a settlement.542 Additionally, coun-
termeasures must be reversible and may not be taken if the wrongful act 
has ceased or if the dispute is pending before a court or tribunal.543 In some 
situations, however, an injured State “may take such urgent countermeas-
ures as are necessary to preserve its rights”544 without notifying the wrong-
doing State of its intention to do so.545  
Under the ITU, an urgent countermeasure would be permissible in cas-
es where the offending State has repeatedly failed to stop harmful interfer-
ence from within its borders or from satellites under its jurisdiction and 
control. An urgent countermeasure would also likely be permissible if 
harmful interference caused a blackout in communications or led to a loss 
of critical State services. In either case, a State may resort to an urgent 
countermeasure to prevent further harm or injury. This would not only 
qualify as a reasonable use of an urgent countermeasure, but would also 
prevent the incident from escalating into a situation, if left unaddressed, 
                                                                                                                      
539. STATE RESPONSIBILITY COMMENTARIES, supra note 498, at 294–96. 
540. Id. at 288–93. 
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542. State Responsibility, supra note 263, art. 52(1). 
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that could ultimately lead to an armed attack and a full blown armed con-
flict. 
Under countermeasures, the principle of proportionality is assessed in 
quantitative and qualitative terms.546 Proportionality requires countermeas-
ures be “commensurate with the injury suffered taking into account the 
gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in question.”547 
While countermeasures need not necessarily be reciprocal, countermeas-
ures are more likely to satisfy the requirements of necessity and propor-
tionality if they are taken in relation to the same or closely related obliga-
tion.548  
In responding to satellite signal interference, a victim State could, but is 
not required to, employ interference as a reciprocal countermeasure.549 For 
example, if satellite jamming disrupts a State’s television broadcasting sig-
nals, reciprocal countermeasures could be in the form of defensive jam-
ming directed back at the intruding signals or jamming other television 
broadcasting signals of the offending State.  
There is, however, no certainty these reciprocal acts would produce 
similar and reciprocal effects, because fashioning a countermeasure only 
injuring the actor that perpetuated the wrongful act may be difficult given 
the interconnectedness of satellite systems and imprecise nature of applying 
satellite signal interference. Reciprocal jamming could also have an unin-
tended and unrealized effect by harming those who have nothing to do 
with the initial unlawful act. This could also result in a situation that spirals 
out of control and creates a new breach of international law.550 For exam-
ple, if a State unlawfully employs a countermeasure, it could incur respon-
sibility for its own wrongful conduct and/or find itself subject to counter-
measures or some other more severe responsive measure as well.  
Because countermeasures need not be reciprocal, but only necessary 
and proportional, an injured State could engage in any other countermeas-
ure meeting the requirements of necessity and proportionality. For in-
stance, since intentional interference with satellite signals is a breach of 
treaty obligations under the ITU, an injured State could respond by sus-
pending performance of its obligations under another treaty or a duty owed 
under customary international law. An injured State could also employ 
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countermeasures such as restricting trade or censoring satellite transmis-
sions of the offending State.  
Even though the law of countermeasures could be viewed as a limited 
answer to the problem of satellite signal interference, it nonetheless pro-
vides States a means to react quickly to breaches of international law. The 
law of countermeasures also offers injured States a valuable tool for ad-
dressing a wide array of incidents. 
 
C. The International Court of Justice 
 
The International Court of Justice has jurisdiction over all cases referred to 
it and over all matters specifically provided for in the UN Charter or in 
treaties in force.551 The Court also issues advisory opinions to legal ques-
tions.552 These opinions, while not binding per se, are not without legal ef-
fect. The Court, a principal organ of the UN, follows the same procedure 
and rules as relied on in binding cases and the legal reasoning therein re-
flects the Court’s authoritative views on important issues of international 
law.553 Moreover, such a decision can prove to be authoritative despite its 
“advisory” nature. For example, the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons advisory opinion has become an authoritative opinion concerning 
the legality under international law of the use or the threatened use of nu-
clear weapons. However, as there is no clause within the ITU and ISL 
frameworks granting the ICJ compulsory jurisdiction to adjudicate matters 
arising thereunder, the ICJ may not exercise jurisdiction unless both parties 
consent.554 It is therefore unlikely a State engaging in satellite signal inter-
ference would ever submit to the ICJ’s jurisdiction or that the ICJ would be 
able to resolve a dispute involving satellite signal interference.  
 
D. Responses under the UN Charter 
 
As previously addressed, under Article 2(4) States are prohibited from us-
ing force or threatening to do so in the course of their international rela-
                                                                                                                      
551. Statute of the ICJ, supra note 278, art. 36. 
552. Id., art. 65. 
553. Pieter H.F. Bekker, The UN General Assembly Requests a World Court Advisory Opin-
ion on Israel's Separation Barrier, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW INSIGHTS 
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tions. The only accepted exceptions explicitly permitted by the Charter are 
measures authorized by the Security Council555 and actions taken in self-
defense.556  
 
1. Measures Authorized by the UN Security Council 
 
Pursuant to Article 24 of the Charter, the Security Council has primary re-
sponsibility for maintaining international peace and security. While collec-
tive measures specifically authorized by the Security Council are set forth in 
Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII, only those authorized under Chapter VII 
(Articles 39–51) fall within the permissible exceptions to the general prohi-
bition on the use or threat of force under Article 2(4).557 On the legal basis 
of Chapter VII, the UN Security Council authorized armed action in Korea 
in 1950,558 Iraq in 1990,559 Darfur in 2006,560 Libya in 2011561 and Mali in 
2012.562  
However, before the Security Council can adopt any enforcement 
measure, armed or otherwise, it must, under Article 39 “determine the ex-
istence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression 
and make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken . . . to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.”563 The range of inci-
dents the Security Council has determined as giving rise to “threats to the 
peace” or “a breach to the peace” is extensive, and has involved country- 
specific situations such as inter-State564 and intra-State conflicts,565 terror-
                                                                                                                      
555. U.N. Charter ch. 7. 
556. Id., art.. 51. 
557. Id., ch. 7. 
558. S.C. Res. 83, U.N. Doc. S/1511 (June 27, 1950). 
559. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990). 
560. S.C. Res. 1706, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006). 
561. S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).  
562. S.C. Res. 2085, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2085 Dec. 20, 2012). 
563. U.N. Charter art. 39. 
564. By Resolution 1291, in 2000 the Security Council noted its concern over the ille-
gal exploitation of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the 
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rica” and “to the peace process for Liberia.” S.C. Res. 1497, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1497 
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ists’ acts,566 the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction567 and internal 
conflicts with a regional dimension.568  
When Article 39 determinations are made, the Security Council “shall 
make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accord-
ance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.”569 Security Council decisions made under Article 39 are binding 
upon UN member States through the combined application of Article 25 
and Article 103.  
Despite little clarity as to the meaning and scope of the phrase “threats 
to the peace,” other than such threats must be distinguishable from activi-
ties constituting threats of the use of force as prohibited under Article 
2(4),570 a breach of the peace is often characterized by hostilities between 
the armed units of States.571 However, the Council has also found deliber-
ate targeting of civilian populations, as well as systematic, flagrant and 
widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, 
to be threats to international peace and security.572 
                                                                                                                      
565. By Resolution 660, the Security Council determined that there existed “a breach 
of international peace and security with regards to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.” S.C. Res. 
660, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (Aug. 2, 1990). 
566. In October 2005, by Resolution 1636, the Security Council determined that the 
terrorist act that killed the former Prime Minister of Lebanon Rafiq Hariri, as well as the 
act’s implications, constituted a threat to international peace and security. S.C. Res. 1636, 
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568. Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression 
(Chapter VII), REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, 
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570. Schmitt, Cyber Operations, supra note 427, at 161. 
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572. For example, by Resolution 1769, in 2007 the Council reiterated its deep concern 
for the security of humanitarian aid workers and their access to populations in need, and 
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the rest of the Sudan, as well as the region. The Council determined that the situation in 
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1769, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1769 (July 31, 2007). Additionally, by Resolution 1778, the 
Council expressed the gravest concern that the situation in the region of the border be-
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It is uncertain as to when the Security Council might declare satellite 
signal interference a threat or breach of the peace. More likely than not, 
satellite signal interference resulting in death or damage to property would 
qualify as a breach of the peace. However, whether acts short of death or 
damage would be so qualified is unknown because the Security Council 
enjoys considerable discretion when making determinations.573 As noted by 
Professor Schmitt, a threat to the peace is a political decision, not a legal 
one.574 In other words, it is whatever the Security Council decides it to 
be.575  
With this understanding, the question becomes, under what circum-
stances might the Security Council consider satellite signal interference to 
be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or an act of aggression, and 
authorize responsive measures. The answer depends solely on the circum-
stances of the case, as well as the relationship of the five permanent mem-
bers of the Council to the issue under consideration.576 For instance, if any 
one of the five permanent members has an interest in the act under consid-
eration and exercises their right to veto pursuant to Article 27, it would 
block all but procedural resolutions of the Council.577  
However, because the use of force, aggressions and acts of violence al-
ways presume a breach of the peace,578 any satellite signal interference con-
stituting aggression or a use of force should result in Security Council reso-
lutions, recommendations or measures taken in accordance with Articles 41 
and 42. Despite this, and given the selective actions of the Security Council, 
such a result seems highly speculative. Nevertheless, should the Security 
Council determine a situation caused by satellite signal interference is of 
greater gravity than merely endangering the maintenance of international 
peace and security,579 a threat to the peace determination could be made.  
                                                                                                                      
tween the Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic constituted “a threat to interna-
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If the Security Council determines peace is threatened, that alone is suf-
ficient to take action as necessary under Articles 41 and 42. Such measures 
may even be preceded by provisional action taken under Article 40 to pre-
vent aggravation of the situation and induce negotiations. Regardless, once 
the Security Council decides an incident constitutes a threat to international 
peace and security, breach of the peace or an act of aggression, the Security 
Council can respond by either non-forcible measures under Article 41 or 
forcible measures under Article 42. 
Pursuant to Article 41, non-forcible measures include “complete or 
partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, tele-
graphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of 
diplomatic relations.” What is interesting to note, however, is that “inter-
ruption of . . . communication[s]” is considered as “measures not involving 
the use of armed force.” Under this characterization, one could argue that 
satellite signal interference may never constitute a use of force. This author 
asserts such an interpretation is far too overreaching because drafters of 
the Charter never contemplated satellite signal interference would be used 
to cause physical damage and human injury.580 Regardless, the Security 
Council may authorize any measure under Article 41 deemed necessary to 
respond to the act at issue to maintain or restore international peace and 
security, including an authorization to employ satellite signal interference.  
Where the Security Council feels measures prescribed under Article 41 
are unsuccessful or would be inadequate, it may, pursuant to Article 42, 
“take action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or 
restore international peace and security.” Such action extends to demon-
strations, blockades, and other armed operations by air, sea or land forces 
of members of the United Nations. Despite this authority to resort to for-
cible means, this author believes it is highly unlikely the Security Council 
would ever authorize force against satellite signal interference. Where satel-
lite signal interference is ongoing or cannot be otherwise stopped, however, 
forcible means are certainly within the Security Council’s purview. In this 
case, the only factors limiting the Security Council’s actions are norms 
within international law, including the IHL prohibition on attacking the 
civilian population and civilian objects, as well as the principles of necessity 
and proportionality. 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
580. Relying on Schmitt, Computer Network Attack, supra note 419, at 912. 
 
 
 
Legality of Interference with Commercial Satellite Signals Vol. 90 
 
193 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. The Right of Self-Defense 
 
The second exception to the UN Charter’s prohibition of the use of force 
is the right of self-defense embodied in Article 51. In the Nicaragua case, 
the ICJ recognized the right of self-defense in Article 51 refers to pre-
existing customary law.581 Article 51 provides: 
 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individu-
al or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of 
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures neces-
sary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by 
Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the au-
thority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Char-
ter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to main-
tain or restore international peace and security. 
 
While States have the inherent right of self-defense, States are only 
permitted to exercise that right by way of a forcible response in the event 
an armed attack occurs and only until the Security Council takes measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security. Thus, the right to 
self-defense cannot be asserted against acts falling short of armed attacks.582 
This means satellite signal interference must rise to the level of an armed 
attack for a State to respond lawfully under Article 51. As noted previously, 
however, armed attacks constitute the “most grave forms of the use of 
force.”583 Thus, if this threshold is not reached, a State’s response is limited 
to non-forceful means, lawful countermeasures or recourse to the Security 
Council. If the armed attack threshold is reached, however, Security Coun-
cil authorization is not required before a State can take defensive action.  
Additionally, satellite signal interference employed as a component of 
an ongoing or broader military action otherwise constituting an armed at-
tack does not alter the nature of the attack. For example, satellite signal in-
terference may be employed against an enemy’s air defense system or mili-
tary communication infrastructure as part of a larger military operation. In 
this case, a State would be able to respond forcefully to this interference 
because it is an element of the overall military action. Likewise, satellite sig-
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nal inference employed as a component of a lawful military response to an 
armed attack may be permissible so long as its use complies with IHL pro-
hibitions against attacking civilians and civilian objects in addition to the 
principles of necessity and proportionality. 
 
E. Legal Criteria for Engaging Self-Defense 
 
As held by the ICJ in Nicaragua, all actions taken in self-defense, whether 
individual or collective, must comply with the principles of necessity and 
proportionality.584 The ICJ has also repeatedly recognized self-defense war-
rants only those measures “proportional to the armed attack and necessary 
to respond to it” as a “rule well established” in customary law.585 The prin-
ciple of necessity requires measures taken in self-defense must have been 
necessary for that purpose, “leaving no room for any ‘measure of discre-
tion.’”586 That is, the force used must be timely,587 necessary to halt and re-
pel the attack,588 and non-forcible measures must be either futile or have 
been exhausted in an unsatisfactory manner.589 The principle of propor-
tionality addresses the issue of how much force is permissible.590 It requires 
the scale, scope, duration and intensity of a defensive response be limited 
to that which is necessary to neutralize or repel an attack underway.591 Ad-
ditionally, the principle of proportionality does not restrict the defending 
State to use the same weapons or amount of force as the attacking State, 
nor is it limited to action within its own territory.592 
The principles of necessity and proportionality make a response to sat-
ellite signal interference particularly challenging because a State may be re-
quired to employ a wide array of passive measures prior to resorting to any 
forcible course of action. For instance, if non-forcible measures are suffi-
cient to stop the attack, a State may not engage in forcible measures. If, 
however, non-forcible measures are inadequate, forcible measures includ-
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ing kinetic operations may be employed, assuming they also conform to the 
applicable legal constraints of IHL.  
  
F. Jus in Bello and Satellite Signal Interference 
 
As discussed in Section III, intentional interference with commercial com-
munication satellites in the context of armed conflict poses serious chal-
lenges to IHL. Not only can almost every civilian satellite be used for civil-
ian and military purposes simultaneously, but also it may be impossible to 
avoid causing harm to civilians and civilian objects when satellite signals are 
targeted and interrupted. In addition, because military communications are 
increasingly flowing through civilian satellite systems, it is becoming more 
and more difficult to isolate, attack and disrupt only military communica-
tions. Moreover, due to the interconnectedness of satellite infrastructure, it 
is practically impossible to foresee the effects military action can have on 
the civilian population. Thus, even though IHL requires States to consider 
the collateral consequences of satellite signal interference to the maximum 
extent possible before any military action is taken, the practical application 
is unclear regarding the impact satellite signal interference will have on the 
civilian population and what foreseen and unforeseen consequences will 
follow.  
Despite this, with proper consideration and anticipatory planning, satel-
lite signal interference could become the preferred tool in warfare because 
it has the potential to limit human suffering when compared to traditional 
means of kinetic warfare. As discussed in Section III, the purpose of most 
satellite signal interference is to temporarily disrupt communications, not to 
cause physical destruction. Moreover, as soon as the military advantage is 
achieved, the purpose of the attack dissolves. Thus, satellite signal interfer-
ence persists only temporarily and with reversible effects, thereby providing 
a distinct advantage not offered by conventional weapons. Accordingly, 
despite some effects resulting during an armed conflict, satellite signal in-
terference also appears consistent with the goals of IHL. Satellite signal 
interference can result in less loss of life, does not require physical destruc-
tion of the objective, seeks only to disable or disrupt a target for a limited 
amount of time and is reversible.  
Given the unique nature of intentional interference, every effort must 
be made to apply the existing principles of IHL as directly and thoroughly 
as possible to dual-use commercial communication satellites. While this 
suggests States should, at all times, be obligated to segregate their military 
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communications from civilian communications and use only military satel-
lites, in practice, there is no ability to do so. Regardless, compliance with 
IHL principles and rules is not only required to the maximum extent pos-
sible, but also vital to ensuring the protection of all humanity and future 
generations from the frightening consequences of future wars. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Commercial communication satellites are integrated into almost every as-
pect of modern day life. These satellites, however, lack sufficient protec-
tions against interference and jamming. As a result, commercial communi-
cation satellites are becoming increasingly vulnerable to the consequences 
of disruptions. The ITU framework, ISL and general international law con-
tain provisions prohibiting satellite signal interference. Legal norms also 
obligate States to take the requisite steps necessary to stop any interference 
originating within their territories. These existing norms, however, have 
proven ineffective in containing and constraining intentional interference. 
Nevertheless, States are unwilling to vest regulatory authorities with en-
forcement powers, often fail to report incidents of satellite signal interfer-
ence and do not pursue reparations under international law. While the basis 
for such inaction is uncertain, it appears many States are unwilling to call 
negative attention to activities they too enjoy and wish to preserve. Never-
theless, if satellite transmission disruptions become increasingly widespread 
and lead to significant physical damages, severe economic losses or sub-
stantial human injuries, States will look to the UN Charter to form a legal 
basis to respond to such acts.  
As demonstrated, the prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4) 
is adaptable to the emerging realities of satellite signal interference, and 
States will likely look to accepted criteria to identify those instances in 
which satellite signal interference results in unacceptable and prohibited 
consequences. States are also always permitted to respond with self-help 
measures to breaches of international law that both do and do not rise to a 
use of force. As noted above, this could include severing diplomatic rela-
tions, imposing trade embargos, closing borders to the offending State and 
even engaging in countermeasures as appropriate and as guided by interna-
tional law.  
For satellite signal interference to rise to the level of an armed attack 
and trigger a States’ right to respond in self-defense, however, only those 
instances that constitute the most grave forms of force will qualify. Thus, 
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while few instances of satellite signal interference are likely to ever trigger 
the right of self-defense, it is a possibility States cannot afford to ignore. 
This is especially true for those States employing satellite signal interference 
and/or permitting such acts within their territories. In any case, State re-
sponses, regardless of weapons employed, are limited to those contained in 
international law and must conform to the principles within IHL. 
To the extent satellite signal interference is employed as a means of 
warfare, IHL undoubtedly requires it be necessary, proportional and dis-
criminate, as well as humane. While the availability of satellite signal inter-
ference as a means and method of warfare serves to increase the options 
available to States for minimizing collateral damage and incidental injury to 
civilians, whether IHL can protect the civilian population from the effects 
of interference remains to be seen. It will depend on how States interpret 
IHL with regard to satellite signal interference, and to what extent States 
exercise restraint and the utmost due care when targeting satellite signals. 
Even then, the reality is civilians will become victims of modern warfare, 
because as civilian infrastructures increasingly become dual-use and thus 
valid military objectives, they can and will be subjected to targeting and at-
tack.  
 
